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It was the purpose of this paper to trace the develop-
ment of the concept of limited war up to 1950, to discuss
its development and application in Korea and Viet Nam and,
finally, to discuss the concept as it is implemented in the
foreign policy of the United States.
Limited war, as developed in an historical sense,
requires the application of limited means to achieve limited
objectives* Limited war, as a non-uniform historical phe-
nomenon, adapts itself to the international political envi-
ronment* U.S. limited war policy in Korea was a classic
example of the limitation of means. U.S. limited war policy
in Viet Nam, while in reality an effort to maintain a power
position in Southeast Asia, has divorced itself from the con-
cept of limited war by attaching unlimited means to limited
ends.
The author has analysed these politico-military














I. THE LIMITATION OP WAR 1
Definition of Limited War 1
Types of Limited War • •••••••• 4
Current Possibilities for Limited War • • • • . 5
Limiting War • 7
Limited Strategic War and Graduated
Retaliation 9
Indirect Retaliation •••• 11
Guerrilla Warfare 11
Local Defense •• ••«••••••• 12
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED WAR .... 15
Summary of Limited War up to 1914 27
An Age of Total War ••• 30
III. KOREA—A CASE STUDY . 34
The View of the Truman Administration • • • • • 41
MacArthur's View 47
The Lessons of Korea •••• ••••• 50
IV. VIET NAM—A SECOND CASE STUDY 56
U.S. Involvement •• ••• 58





















Tactics in Viet Nan . . . 67
U.S. Tactics • • « • 69
The Lessons of Viet Nam 78
V. LIMITED WAR—CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR 80
VI. U.S. LIMITED WAR STRATEGY 91
Requirements ••••••••••• 91
Objectives • • 98
Capabilities ••• 106





The foreign policy of the United States has been, and
still is, to a large extent, conditioned by the attitudes of
the American people towards the use of force* The unusual
circumstances under which the United States developed as a
nation, as well as the international environment within
which she achieved great power status, have preconditioned
these attitudes* U.S. policy vis-£-vis the use of force in
foreign affairs has undergone numerous changes since the
United States emerged on the political scene as an actor
rather than an observer. Throughout this development, how-
ever, there existed, in U.S. foreign policy, certain con-
tinuing elements* Among these elements, or ingredients, the
more important ones are: practical politics, economic
necessity, ideology, and a senset of mission*
Prior to the Second World War, the limited use of
force, or the threat of it, was a recurring theme of U.S*
foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere* The United States
found it necessary to intervene in Western hemispheric af-
fairs no less than thirty times from 1898 to the present*
One intervention, in fact, lasted twelve years* As the
status of the United States grew so also did its responsi-
bilities* The United States, in its new position of power,
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found it less and less profitable to show its strength bla-
tantly. 1
In the wake of the Second World War, the concept of
the limited exercise of military power began to take on
added importance in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The
development of this concept has never been better typified
than in the two selected case studies—Korea and Viet Nam.
It is with this in mind that the concept of limited war is
analyzed in this paper.
It is the purpose of this paper to trace the develop-
ment of the concept of limited war up to 1950, to discuss
its development and application in Korea and Viet Nam and,
finally, to discuss the concept as it is implemented in the
foreign policy of the United States.
The observation has been frequently made that nothing
stultifies military thought so much as a victorious war, for
innovation, then, must run the gamut of inertia legitimized
2by success. This statement might well be taken as the key-
stone for this paper. Post-World War II thinking in the
United States conceptualized military posture in terms of
the lessons thought to have been learned during the war.
"On Intervention" an editorial in The Washington
Post , May 5, 1965.
2Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
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This politico-military misconception tended to crystallise
American ideas of what our national security policy should
be , at a moment in history when the dynamics of technologi-
cal change were to require the greatest possible flexibility*
World War II experiences taught us, so we thought, that the
ultimate criterion for victory was the capacity to out-
produce the enemy* This, in itself, was a fallacy which
ignored the lessons of history, some of which were indelibly
written into the record of the Second World War* In 1940,
for example, superior doctrine enabled the Germans to defeat
an Allied army, superior in numbers, at least equal in
equipment, but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare*
Superior mobility and the more effective massing of artil-
lery (a better relationship between fire and movement)
provided the basis for Napoleon's success* There are many
more similar examples of victories not of resources but of
strategic doctrine* The ability to break the framework
which had come to be taken for granted, and to confront the
antagonist with contingencies which he had never even con-
sidered, became a decisive factor in World War II. History
had repeatedly shown this to be true* But the United
States, having won ultimate victory in two world conflicts
by out-producing the enemy, decided to equate military












superiority with superiority in potential military capa-
bility and in superior technological skill.
United States postwar concepts of strategic thought
were shortly to be confronted with a disturbing phenomenon
in Josef Stalin's 1946-1950 communist offensive* The
phenomenon of limited military aggression was one toward
which little or none of our strategic thinking had been
oriented. It is this type of military activity, and the
response to it, which is to be assayed in this paper. It is
the evolution of this politico-military phenomenon which is






THE LIMITATION OP WAR
The means whereby men limit the dimensions of warfare
are numerous) the variations are infinite* Examples of
limited war, in the past, reflect many different examples of
the efforts of politicians to maintain armed conflict at a
level of intensity which permits some degree of control and
restraint* Despite the complexity of the subject, however,
it is necessary to attempt at least to analyse the limita-
tion of war in the light of some of its more basic variables*
Definition of Limited War
Before getting too deeply involved into the ramifica-
tions of the subject of limited war, a definition must be
postulated* At first glance, a definition seemed to be the
least of the problems presented by the consideration of the
general topic of limited war* However, it was soon dis-
covered that many self-appointed experts held different
views regarding the definition of limited war* In a general
sense, however, all these definitions contained the same
basic ingredients* Through the course of history, limited
war has acquired different aspects as a direct result of the
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2A limited war, then, is a conflict, involving organ-
ized violence, in which the belligerents restrict the pur-
poses for which they fight, to concrete, well-defined
objectives* These objectives are restricted in two major
respects:
1. They do not require the maximum military expendi-
ture of force of which the antagonists are capable*
2* They are such that they can be accommodated in a
negotiated settlement*
More often than not, a limited war involves two (or
very few) contenders* The fighting is generally confined to
a local geographic area and directed, usually, against
selected targets, primarily of explicit military importance*
The fighting itself places demands upon the belligerents
which are less than the maximum of physical and human re-
sources* The limited war, during its conduct, permits the
economic, social, and political patterns of existence of the
belligerents to continue without serious derogation*
From this definition, it can be noted that limited
war is partly a matter of degree* That is, war's limitation,
or lack of it, depends upon the scope of the objectives for
which the belligerents fight and upon the dimensions of
force they employ in order to achieve their own objectives
and to deprive the enemy of his* Nevertheless, that degree
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3difficult to identify limited wars as distinct historical
phenomena.
A cursory review of the history of warfare shows,
however, that limited war is not a uniform phenomenon.
Limitation can occur in many different ways* A war can be
limited in some respects and not in others, depending upon
its physical characteristics and the perspective of the
opponents* Conceivably then, a war can be limited in geo-
graphic scope but virtually unlimited in the weapons used
and the targets involved within the area of combat. On the
other hand, a war can range over an extensive geographic
area and involve a number of belligerents and yet, as in the
Seven Years War (1756-1763), remain very limited in the
scale of its battles. It should be noted, however, in this
last example, that such a war would be highly unlikely in
this present day and age of military technology, transporta-
tion, and communications. Furthermore, a war may be limited
from the perspective of one of the belligerents and virtu-
ally unlimited in the view of the other. Thus, a war in-
volving a limited commitment of the resources of two major
powers within some peripheral strategic area, like the
Korean peninsula, may be a matter of life and death to a
third power that is unfortunate enough to inhabit the area
of combat.
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Types of Limited War
The protected environment within which the United
States developed, free from the machinations and interfer-
ence of European power politics, had an unfortunate effect
upon the American concept of limited war* Americans tend to
consider limited war as an "aberration from the pure case."
and, therefore, have paid little heed to its implications
2
and its opportunities. This fact is due, in a sense, to
the way in which Americans have tended to legitimize the
limited wars in which they have contended* Every war in
which the United States has been engaged in the Western
Hemisphere has been a limited war in the sense that it did
not require the full mobilization of human and physical
resources* However, the United States invariably justified
them as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, and, conse-
quently, they rarely entered into the national consciousness
as part of the phenomena of limited war*
The controversy over limited war, which has raged
since the Korean intervention, has tended to confuse the
issues because it has failed to distinguish between the
various forms of limited war* In addition to the examples
American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1957), pp* 1-2*
2.Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear weapons an 1 Foreign
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5mentioned above, is the type of conflict in which there is a
tremendous disparity between the protagonists. Whatever the
objectives set by the great power, her expenditure of war
effort would be minor. On the other hand, for the smaller
contender, the conflict would, more than likely, be an all-
out effort. A variation of this type of limited war would
occur if the stronger belligerent were restrained from ex-
erting its full potential by moral, political, or strategic
considerations. Once again, the Korean Intervention can be
cited as an example. Once the Chinese People's Republic
became involved, her commitment probably involved close to
her maximum feasible effort; whereas, for a number of
reasons, the United States effort remained limited. Yet
another type of limited war was engaged in by Russia and
Japan in 1905, in which the Russian commitment was limited
to the forces which could be supplied to the scene of action
by a single-track railway. Finally, there can occur a
limited conflict between two major powers which is kept from
escalating by tacit agreement rather than through difficul-
ties in technology or logistics.
Present Possibilities of Limited War
In the context of the present-day political milieu,
there are four general categories which can be distinguished





6The first type includes limited wars between second-
ary powers, such as India and Pakistan, regardless of
whether or not they might involve the danger of major powers
being drawn into the conflict.
The second type of limited war consists of those con-
flicts involving either the Western powers or the Communist
bloc against countries which are clearly outmatched and
under circumstances in which outside intervention is un-
likely* An example of this type of conflict is the Soviet
intervention in Hungary in 1956, or perhaps U.S. interven-
tion in Santo Domingo in 1965*
A third category of possible limited war is that
between a major power and a secondary power which may in-
volve the possibility of escalation as in the present case
of Viet Nam* whereas the U.S. air attacks in the spring and
summer of 1965 were conducted under the guise of assistance
to the independence of South Viet Nam, in accordance with
the 1954 Geneva Agreements, they could easily escalate into
a general war between the Chinese People's Republic and
North Viet Nam, on the one hand, and the United States, on
the other.
A final category is the limited war between two major
powers in a strategic peripheral area such as Southeast
Asia. This is obviously the most dangerous situation. If
however, a limited war could be kept limited in this last
. _
.....-.
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category, it could clearly be kept from escalating in the
3first three*
Limiting War
The concept of limitation, in any conflict, pre-
supposes three basic requirements:
1. The forces available for conducting limited war
must be able to prevent the aggressor from creating a fait
accompli ,
2. These forces must be of a nature to convince
clearly an aggressor that their use, while involving an in-
creased risk of general war, is not necessarily an inevitable
prelude to it*
3. These forces must be associated with a diplomacy
which clearly conveys the idea that general war is not the
sole response to aggression and that there is a willingness
4to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional surrender*
The dilemma of massive retaliation will confront the
West only when its limited war forces are clearly incapable
of successfully resisting a limited aggression* If this
situation were permitted to exist, aggression would be in-
vited, blackmail would be encouraged, and the West would
3Ibid ., pp. 117-119.
Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (Hew
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8find itself on the horns of a fearful dilemma—the choice
between unqualified surrender or general war*
The nature of the application, of limited war forces
to resist a probe, must be clearly associated with a diplo-
matic posture able to take advantage of pauses in military
operations to negotiate a settlement* Therefore, if the
issue is made to depend purely upon military considerations,
any conflict is likely to expand, by degrees, into a general
war*
How, then, can these three requirements be met.*
There are several arguments currently receiving support*
One group indicates that a retaliatory force is also suit-
able for a limited war because of its ability to conduct
either graduated retaliation or limited strategic warfare.
Another group advocates a strategy of indirect retaliation
designed to punish an aggressor, though not necessarily at
the point of aggression. Still another group would rely
upon guerrilla warfare* Finally, there is a school of
thought built upon the concept of local defense*
These proposals all contain seeds of feasibility and
are all intended to resist aggression short of general war*
Each of them has uses in deterring aggression and providing
alternatives to all-out war. However, the implications of
each regarding diplomacy, strategy, and deterrence vary. It
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9Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation
The concepts of limited strategic war and graduated
retaliation are based on the premise that the retaliatory
force can be used for purposes other than general war.
Limited strategic war seeks to resist aggression, by meas-
ures which are normally a prelude to general war, without
making an irrevocable commitment to a showdown. In this
type of war, an attempt would be made to achieve a military
advantage but stopping somewhat short of an all-out blow.
As an example, a hypothetical occupation of West Berlin
might be responded to by the destruction of some portion of
the Soviet air defense warning system or perhaps a distinct
portion of its retaliatory force. Such a response, accord-
ing to advocates of this line of thinking, would serve as a
warning and also decrease Soviet invulnerability to an all-
out attack. The combined effect of such a reply would be to
lead to a restoration of the status quo .
The theory of graduated retaliation would be somewhat
similar but would not strive for a military advantage. In-
stead, sufficient damage would be inflicted upon the enemy
to cause him to desist. In case of an attack upon some
peripheral strategic areas, for example, advocates of "gradu-
ated retaliation" would recommend an enunciated program of
destruction against specified installations on a graduated
basis until the enemy ceased the aggression.
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10
The weak point, in this line of action, is the diffi-
culty in conveying to an enemy the fact that this response
was, in fact, graduated retaliation and not the prelude to a
general war. If the desire is conveyed to establish some
limit to this sort of retaliation, the threat of a general
war may lose some of its credibility* On the other hand, if
the intent to limit the employment of retaliatory force is
not correctly communicated to the enemy, a preemptive attack
by him would seem inevitable* In short, the threat of lim-
ited strategic war or graduated retaliation is either too
5
credible or not credible enough*
The concept of the use of nuclear weapons, in various
limited degrees and programs as a response to any form of
aggression, began to lose what credibility it had as the
Soviet Union approached a situation of nuclear parity with
the United States* The concept devolved from a general
desire in the United states to replace American lives with
technological superiority on the battlefield* About the
time the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological parity,
at least in the field of missile boosters and delivery
systems, the value of this line of thinking became suspect*
Vestiges of this line of thought still retain active adher-
ence in the application of tactical nuclear weapons in




..^noqaei ~£*\s ar«r:j $r;0l MM






feMMnt :' t v ' . ''.OS Jofl
. 'A C0 '




i M - *•< 1
.v,jfiiviaow«o 0oi/tU J»2va£ »rt# »*U4
*|C0 Jli 4s0«I 10
Sc •. :v »j14
,
«*0**y«
« pni to an*** « «0 i0# b»
• 9dMSd »<JQ « *^^|
11
superiority in ground forces as might occur in a large-scale
ground action in Western Europe or Korea*
Indirect Retaliation
Those who advocate a strategy of indirect retaliation
address themselves to a basic dilemma of U.S. strategy. On
the one hand, it is considered too risky to launch any sort
of attack upon the communist homeland. On the other hand,
it is impossible to defend, effectively, a twenty thousand
mile perimeter drawn around this homeland. Adherents of
indirect retaliation advocate a response calculated in
severity to match the gravity of the aggression but involv-
ing measures such as blockades and economic sanctions,
utilizing U.S. superiority in sea power, for example, to
force a withdrawal of enemy units without resorting to an
overt act of war. Unfortunately, a strategy of indirect
retaliation would be an invitation to blackmail by reducing
the risk to a potential aggressor. A strategy based en-
tirely upon indirect retaliation must lead eventually to a
disintegration of the free world.
Guerrilla warfare
Many thoughtful analysts, concluding that any major











the unacceptable risk of a general nuclear war, advocate the
organization, on a massive scale, of a guerrilla warfare
capability in all free world states, but especially in those
areas peripheral to the communist homeland. This capability,
it is thought, would present a potential aggressor with an
insuperable problem of pacification* Unfortunately, there
is little historical evidence to support the theory that
such resistance would be effective in a communist-controlled
state. Even if this form of resistance were potentially
effective, it would not in any way constitute deterrence.
Partisan activity has been most effective in primitive
societies and in those geographical areas particularly
suited to this form of resistance. Partisan warfare can
make an Important contribution to other forms of resistance,
but it cannot be substituted for them.
Local Defense
A capacity for local defense is essential to align
deterrent policy with the strategy for fighting a limited
war in satisfying the requirements for U.S. security and
that of its allies. Local defense with ground forces in-
volves attempts to deny to the aggressor the territory which
he is seeking to gain, by direct ground defense of the local
area. This strategy could be implemented by indigenous
forces with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons.














by presenting an adequate local defense force capable of
effectively defending a particular piece of territory
•
There may be some cases, however, in which the United
States fights a war for goals which do not require victory
in the local encounter. There may also be areas in the
world where the United States is incapable of winning a
local war or would not want to fight in one. But with those
points in mind, it remains true, as Kaufmann has stated, that
... despite what may be a comparative disadvantage
in manpower, the United States should still be able,
with the aid of indigenous forces, with mobility,
well-organized logistical facilities, great conven-
tional firepower, and highly trained conventional
reserves, not merely to match, but actually to beat
the enemy at this type of game. After all, Greece
and Korea are not figments of the imagination.'
Indigenous forces are an important part of a ground war
effort virtually anywhere in the world. Although they may
be necessarily small, well-trained and well-equipped* indige-
nous forces can provide the crucial functions of triggering
U.S. intervention and serving as a holding action suffi-
ciently long for U.S. intervention to be timely and effec-
tive.
But perhaps more important, indigenous forces would
provide a vital element of discrimination in the fighting of
local wars. If indigenous forces are capable and competent,
William W. Kaufmann, "Limited War," in William W.
Kaufmann ( ed . ) , Military Policy and National Security ( Prince-







they provide a means for American intervention in the form
of supplies, technicians, training, and so forth which is
much less blatant and overt, much less likely to lead to
escalation and to political repercussions than the direct
use of American troops* This was the case in the Taiwan
Straits in 1958 and in Viet Nam in 1961-1963. Legalistic
differences, such as those between intervention with sup-
plies and equipment, and intervention with troops, are an
important factor in the process of limiting war.
The ability to make use of this element, when it is
in the best interests of the United States to do so, may,
3in some circumstances, be crucial.
<Wton H. H«lp«ln, Limits War In th. Nucl.ar Affl
(New York! Wil.y, 1963), pp. 123-1277"
•bOM






THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMEJIT OF LIMITED WAR
It is felt that there are certain lessons to be
derived from history in shaping an approach to the concept
of limited war, in the context of present-day international
politics. One of the first steps in this brief historical
review, however, is to make a very careful and important
distinction* This distinction must be drawn between the
general rules for conducting war, which belligerents are
theoretically free to follow or ignore, at their own risks,
and the obvious features of the international environment
which evolve from a complex sequence of factors in such a
way as to be beyond the power of the states to affect. Of
the general rules necessary for the limitation of war, two
basic ones should be considered for this historical survey
i
1. The belligerents must be prepared to conduct war
in accordance with well-defined limited political objectives
susceptible to accommodation*
2* The belligerents must be prepared to limit the
means used in achieving these objectives so that the means
of war will be proportional to the ends*
Robert E* Osgood, Limited War—The Challenge to
American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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The history of wax demonstrates an interaction be-
tween the objectives and the scale of intensity of a war.
The greater the value that belligerents attach to certain
objectives, the greater the dimension of force they will be
prepared to exert to achieve them* The greater the scale
and intensity, the less susceptible will the objectives be
to accommodation* At the same time, the consequences will
be less subject to control and prediction* Therefore, al-
though the deliberate delimitation of political objectives
is a necessary ingredient to limited war, the advances in
weapons technology and thus applicable physical force have
made the rational control of war Increasingly difficult*
Despite the interaction between means and ends, the ends are
more fundamental in providing a guiding political decision
to pursue limited objectives* Even the most rudimentary
means can lead to unlimited war when the ends are not
limited* Osgood points out rather incisively that "Rome did
2
not need nuclear weapons to destroy Carthage*"
Two periods of modern Western history stand out as
predominantly periods of limited war: the period from the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the French Revolutionary War,
and the period from the Congress of Vienna in 1315 to the
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statesmen were constrained to fight for well-defined and
well-limited reasons of state which generally possessed the
following characteristics t
1* They did not incite extreme aspirations or fears.
2* They demanded something less than the maximum
exercise of force*
3* They could be accommodated in a settlement before
military destruction got out of hand*
The typical limited war in Europe in the 18a and 19»
centuries was fought to gain marginal adjustments in the
balance-of-power which were not achievable through normal
diplomatic Intercourse. The objectives were varied* They
included the acquisition of a particular piece of territory,
the dynastic authority or succession in a state, trade rela-
tions between countries, or the exploitation of foreign
markets, land or resources* Regardless of the objectives at
stake, it is noteworthy that all these wars followed the
same sequence:
1* They were customarily accommodated in a nego-
tiated settlement*
2* The sting of defeat was usually soothed by com-
pensations taken from weaker states or carved out of over-
seas empires*
















the statesmen of the necessity of waging wax to the utmost
physical limits*
The period from 1721 to 1740 was the longest period
of European peace between the Religious Wars and the Con-
gress of Vienna* There was no general war during the one
hundred year period between the Congress of Vienna and World
War I) and only during the seventeen years from 1S54 to 1871
did major world powers fight one another* The distinguish-
ing feature of the two periods 1643 to 1792 and 1815 to 1914
is not the low incidence of warfare* Far from its It was
the relative moderation of the intensity of war compared to
its ferocity during other adjacent periods, notably the
Religious Wars of the 16a and 17a centuries and the "period
of total war*1 in the 20» century*
It is true that, even in the 18m century, during which
warfare was generally conducted with a higher degree of con-
straint than any other period of modern civilization, there
were some exceptions. Some of the dynastic wars of Louis
XIV, which did not end until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714,
were as savage and devastating as the struggles in the
Germanies during the Religious Wars* The pitched battles of
the 18tk century, though not so frequent as in previous cen-
turies, were exceedingly bloody* The three partitions of
Poland were virtually unlimited wars, at least from the









warfare was a formal, mechanical, and almost decorous opera-
tion*
The tactics of war were like a game of chess* The
ultimate goal might be the capture of a fortress; but the
game was often decided almost bloodless ly, by a skillful
maneuver into a superior position* To surrender a fortress
with honor, after a minimum of destruction and in accordance
with certain conventional formalities, was a highly devel-
oped art*
The measure of military effectiveness was not the
amount of destruction of enemy forces* Precision was more
valued than sheer force* Ingenuity was more prized than
seal* Thus, pitched battles were rare and often indecisive*
Eighteenth century warfare was conducted so as to
interfere with the lives of the civilian population—espe-
cially the merchants—as little as possible and to conserve
and protect the hired soldier as much as possible* Thus,
the burning and sacking of villages and farms, so common
during the Religious Wars, was rare in the 18$ century*
Furthermore, military operations were confined, generally,
to half the calendar year to avoid the rigors of winter cam-
paigns.
Obviously, all these "house rules" set severe limita-
tions upon military efficiency* Yet they were well adapted
to the limited purposes for which they were employed* Most
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important, by affording the civilian population a unique
freedom from the devastation of war, they gave maximum scope
to the peaceful pursuits which were the real measure of
man's progress in this era*
Limited wars in the 19ft century were a far cry from
the prosaic contests of the previous century* The physical
potentialities for destruction forever ended the cumbersome
tactics of maneuver and position which were the trademark of
18a century warfare* Nonetheless, in their extent and in
their impact upon the material, social, and economic founda-
tions of society, these wars were significantly restricted*
This is especially true in comparison to the French Revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic Wars which preceded them. The
Crimean War (1853-1856), the Austro-Sardinian War (1859),
the war of Prussia and Russia against Denmark (1864), the
Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian war (1870-
1871), the Russo-Turkish War (1877), the Spanish-American
War ( 1898 ) , the Russo-Japanese War ( 1904-1905 ) , the Boer War
(1899-1902), and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)—all these,
except the last, involved major European powers ; yet, they
were all relatively short, local contests which caused
little disruption of society and were settled by an accommo-
dation of limited objectives* Only one war in this period
equaled the Napoleonic Wars in its physical dimensions and
in the magnitude of the objectives at stake, and that was
^
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the American Civil War (1861-1865) which was fought outside
3the mainstream of world politics*
It can be concluded, therefore, that both in their
objectives and in their physical characteristics, the wars of
1643-1792 and 1815-1914 were predominantly limited wars.
There were important economic, social and cultural factors
which help account for this limitation, but primarily
limited warfare was a reflection of the ends of war and of
the means available for the achievement of those ends*
The wars, of the 18» century, were limited for a
variety of reasons, among which are the primitive instru-
ments of destruction and the cumbersome tactics which their
technical deficiencies forced upon the combatants* The
primary limitation, however, was purely one of economics*
Sighteenth century armies were extremely expensive to main-
tain in relation to the resources available to operate them*
The resources and manpower which were available for states
to call upon were very limited* Thus, the training and
tactics of armies in this period were tailored to the re-
quirements of rigid maneuver and position, which precluded
the kind of long-range movements, destructive pursuit, and
rapid exploitation which characterised the wars of vastly
increased scale and intensity in the 19» century* Hans
Osgood, op * cit













Speier concludes that, during this period, the military ex-
penditures of Prance, Russia, and England amounted to more
than two-thirds of their total budget*
Despite the record of monumental blunders and incom-
petence of the Crimean War of 1851-1856, one suspects that
the conflict did not blossom into full-scale general European
war mainly because the belligerents could not draw upon
those resources which were available in 1914* By the same
token, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 might not have
remained so limited if the combatants had not discontinued
operations from sheer exhaustion*
The economic and technological limitations to war
gradually began to disappear during the period from 1815 to
1914, even though the military potential was not fully ex-
ploited* This was the period when the industrial revolution
swept the continent of Europe* It was this development which
underlay the advent of total war. By 1914, the multiplica-
tion of goods and resources provided nations with a war
potential unimagined by 18tt century statesmen* The availa-
bility of vast quantities of fuel, metal, and rapid trans-
portation virtually removed the limitations which, hereto-
fore, had impeded the effective use of the instruments of
4Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War (New










war. A second and associated factor of change was the rapid
advance in technology. The perfection of the breech-loading
rifle, the percussion cartridge, the machine gun and rifled
artillery of greater range and accuracy created unprece-
dented potentialities for destruction.
Unfortunately, the existence or absence of limited
war in any particular period of history cannot be fully
explained in terms of economics and technology. One must
also point to the factors of mass conscription and mass
enthusiasm which were, in turn, the products of novel
5political and ideological goals.
Historically, there has been no greater stimulus
to unlimited war than the injection of highly-
charged ideological and emotional issues and hos-
tilities, for these kinds of issues incite and
sanction an exercise of force to the utmost physical
limits for ends which cannot readily be compromised .6
In this sense, the Religious Wars were unlimited wars,
being primarily the products of the religious passions of
the Reformation, Although the struggle between faiths was
intermingled with the conflict of dynastic ambitions in the
Thirty Years War (1618-1648), it was ideological conflict
that fed the flames which devastated the Germanies, One









losses sustained were about one third of the total popula-
tion. 7
On balance, the Religious Wars were a somber reflec-
tion of a phenomenon which was to recur in our present era*
Ideological differences, when submitted to the judgment of
the sword, tend to produce unlimited violence* unlimited
ends lead to unlimited means*
The wars of the French Revolution and of the Napo-
leonic period sprang from intense emotional and moral
Issues, which militated against the careful political limi-
tation of war* It is small wonder, then, that the French
Revolution brought to a close Europe's greatest period of
limited war* Once it was realised that popular sentiment
could be utilised for state purposes, a vast untapped source
of military power became available to statesmen who were
able to stir national pride and appeal to universal moral
principles* The democratization of war reached its culmina-
tion in the vast conscript armies of the turn of the century
and was the basis for the total wars of the 20a century*
The radical currents of the French Revolution, by making
war a mass effort instead of the sport of kings, the busi-
ness of mercenaries, and the last resort of social outcasts,
ended by revolutionising war*
7
C* V* Wedgewood, Che Thirty Years War (New Haven:
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The interaction between means and ends is traceable
in the post-Napoleonic era* The increase of the means
available when added to the influence of Napoleon on mili-
tary thinking, set the stage for the advent of total war* A
long period of peace followed, from 1815 to 1354, during
which the European political system was restored and states-
men once more absorbed themselves in the intricacies of the
balance—of-power system* Ironically, the one state upon
which the democratization of war had a real impact was
Prussia, the most militaristic state in Europe* Prussia, in
1814, adopted the system of universal military service*
Prussia's quick and overwhelming victories in her wars with
Austria (1866) and with France (1870-1871) had a pronounced
effect upon European statesmen* Soon, Austria (in 1868),
Prance (in 1872), Russia (in 1874), and Italy (in 1875)
8followed Prussia's initiative.
Despite the organisation of military potential on a
much larger scale, the 19m century remained a period of
limited warfare* The basic reason for this lay in the
political philosophy of the leader of the most powerful
state in Europe* Bismarck played the game of politics in
the spirit of the aristocratic school of diplomacy of
Guy S* Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia t







Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, although he may
have lacked their sense of a transcendent European Community,
united by common moral premises. Bismarck recognized the
interdependence of politics and force and frequently, ignor-
ing the advice of his military advisers who would have him
press war beyond the limits of political expedience, pressed
instead for quick and moderate settlements* Bismarck's
sense of the political limits of force was perhaps the major
o
contribution to the limitation of war in his era* Despite
this contribution, it must be noted that his settlement of
the Franco-Prussian War struck a serious blow at the Euro-
pean balance-of-power and augured a fundamental change in
the whole conception of war and politics* This war recalled
to European statesmen a lesson forgotten since the defeat of
Napoleon* Simply stated, this lesson was that military
power, organised on a mass basis, and supported by a na-
tion's total resources, not only could gain small pieces of
territory as a basis for negotiation but could win a light-
ning victory and impose a decisive peace upon a nation which
had lost not only its will, but also its power to resist*
This lesson was not lost on Marshal Foch, who in 1918
became the leader of the Allied armies in the first war to
fulfill the terrible potential of the nation-in-arms
9Osgood, op * cit *. p. 72.
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system* Foch proclaimed the absolute conception of war by
stating
:
The old systems of war, seeking to spare the armed
forces, tried to achieve their objectives by strata-
gems, threat, negotiation, maneuver, partial action,
occupation of territory and the capture of fortified
places* Since Napoleon, war is conducted without
regard to wastage; it recognises only one argument
t
force. Not until the enemy has been crushed in
battle and annihilated in pursuit is there any ques-
tion of parley with him, 3-0
Foch was abandoning the entire concept of limited war
and urging a return to the absolute wars exemplified by
Napoleon and described by Clauswitz. Into Foch*s words, one
reads the antithesis of the very idea of war as a rational
instrument of foreign policy* His words exemplified an ir-
rational fascination with the sheer destructive potentiali-
ties of total war as an instrument of ideology* Foch*s
concept of war contains the idea of the fatal interaction
between means and extreme ends which was to drive war beyond
the limits of rational control and prediction in the period
11
of total war which opened in 1914.
Summary of Limited War up to 1914
The limited objectives of warfare in the 183* century
Ferdinand Foch, "De la Conduite de la Guerre,"
cited by Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde , 1^3-1939 (New
York! Putnams, 1940), p. 45*
Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War , trans, J* de














sprang directly from the prevailing international political
system, the balance-of-power • In accordance with this
system, a dozen or so major states of roughly comparable
power allied, separated, and allied again in ever-shifting
combinations in order to prevent any single power or coali-
tion from gaining preponderance and thereby threatening the
common interest of all powers in maintaining a relatively
stable international order* The central purpose of the
system was the establishment of certain rules of the game by
which all states might pursue their ends without jeopardiz-
ing the political independence of any of its members* The
important feature was that the system put a premium on
rationality, moderation, circumspection, and adherence to
the rules* The balance-of-power system did not prevent war*
Indeed, it would have been miraculous if three hundred or
more sovereign states had been able to adjust their differ-
ences by peaceful means alone* However, the system did
moderate the nature of the issues that led to war and,
therefore, the objectives for which wars were fought* In
the 18tt century, then, war was truly a continuation of
12political intercourse*
Before the 19a century had passed, the democratiza-
tion of society, so greatly accelerated by the French
Osgood, o£. cit.
, pp* 77-78*
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Revolution, had destroyed the social system which had per-
mitted the conduct of politics in nearly complete indiffer-
ence to mass sentiment* There were growing signs, also,
that diplomacy, regardless of how shrewd and circumspect,
could not by Itself preserve a stable international order in
the absence of a broader system of social and moral re*
straints. The political system, Itself, underwent changes
that seriously weakened those restraints it had imposed upon
national ambitions and the struggle for power*
Sven more disruptive of the European balance-of-power
system was the emergence of the great new industrial powers-
Germany, the United States, and Japan) for this augured the
end of Great Britain's role as the balancer of the inter-
national political system*
And so it came about that, with the deterioration of
these political, social, and moral restraints which had
previously facilitated the limitation of the ends and means
of war, the 20& century began with an increasingly intense
competition for military strength* This competition itself
rendered the limitation of war more and more dependent upon
the scrupulous restriction of military means at a time when
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An Age of Total War
The outbreak of general war In 1914 is often said to
have presaged an age of total war* The outbreak of a second
general war in 1939 seems to have convinced the world that
the art of warfare, as practiced prior to 1914, had forever
ended* The injection of ideology into both world wars by
the United States changed their complexions from the normal
power-political context to that of total war, total defeat,
and unconditional surrender* Ho more was war fought in
accordance with Clauswlts' dictum* No more did it have
definite purpose, reasonable limits, or negotiable objec-
tives* It demanded the elimination of the enemy *s ability
14
to resist rather than his desire to do so*
In actual fact, tha two world wars might better be
considered aberrations from the general course of the his-
tory of warfare* The world was paying the price for involv-
ing the Americans in the game of European power politics* A
review of recent history shows that no less than eight
limited wars were begun in the year that marked the end of
World War X* In addition, the Russian Civil War was still
in progress* Of these eight wars, the Polish-Russian War,
the Russo-Finnlsh War, and the Teschen Conflict between
14Charles o* Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the
American People (£nglewood Cliffs, New Jersey* p"rent:lce-
















Poland and Czechoslovakia all ended in 1920. The Anglo-
Irish Conflict continued until 1921 and the Vllna dispute
between Poland and Lithuania lasted until 1922, as did the
Greco-Turkish dispute* The RiffIan War, fought by the
Moroccans against Spain and France, as well as the Chinese
Civil War, both continued through 1926* Fourteen more
limited wars were fought before the outbreak of World War II
once more ushered in a general conflict:




Sandino Insurrection (Nicaragua 1925-1934)
Bolivian-Paraguay Dispute (1928-1930)
Japanese Occupation of Manchuria (1931-1933)
Letitia Dispute (Colombia vs. Peru 1932-1935)
Chaco War (Bolivia vs* Paraguay 1932-1936)
Italian-Ethiopian War (1935-1937)
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)
Russo-Japanese Conflict (Manchuria and Siberian
border incidents 1938-1939)
Russo-Finnish War ( 1939-1941
)
15
In the classical nation-state system, armed forced
wafl the "ultima ratio regll , " the final argument a state
could use to achieve its objectives* Force could be applied
in ways and amounts graduated to the importance of the ob-
jectives and the level of resistance encountered* The new
theory of inter-state conflict, however, made such dis-
crimination unnecessary since the object of the conflict was
the complete capitulation of the enemy*
15Army Magazine . VII, 1955*
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Thus, a political system designed to be balanced by
force became transformed into one in which force might
destroy peoples and cultures but could not win politically
relevant objectives* A huge and expensive effort was made
by the greatest alliance in history to achieve an empty
objective of unconditional surrender* From 1939 to 1945,
16
war and politics had finally become separated*
Limited war once again emerged while the ashes of the
Second World War were still hot* In the same year World War
II ended, four limited wars broke out* The Indonesian War
lasted through 1947* The Chinese Civil War finally ended in
1949* Both the war in Indo-China and the Communist Guerrilla
Warfare in Malaya lasted until 1954* The year 1946 saw the
outbreak of Communist Guerrilla activity in Greece* The
Kashmir Dispute, between India and Pakistan, was fought from
1947 to 1949* The Arab-Israeli War broke out in 1948 and
ended in 1949* Finally, the year 1950 saw the beginning of
hostilities in Korea which were to involve the efforts of
two major powers, which were to have a pronounced effect
upon American foreign policy and which were to establish the
great power status of the Chinese People* s Republic*
16Charles 0* Lerche, Jr* , The Cold War and After
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From 1918 through 1949, a total of thirty-one
limited wars ware fought, la well-defined geographic limits,




The most important post-World War II development in
the study of limited war is the Korean Intervention* The
outbreak of hostilities seems , in retrospect , rather pre-
dictable, although it certainly was not anticipated by U.S.
strategists* The shift in communist pressure, away from an
area of relative U.S. military strength, and attendant risk,
to an area strategically less important and containing
minimal u*s* military strength seems rather logical* The
selection of the Korean peninsula was aptly suited to demon-
strate the ineffectiveness of the U*S* strategic posture*
Clearly, neither massive retaliation nor local defense were
effective deterrents to aggression in this location*
The question of motives for a direct invasion are not
so easily determined from the Soviet standpoint, but some
reasonably good observations expose the advantages of this
type of aggression* In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, dated 27 September 1947, the decision was taken to
withdraw the two U.S. Army divisions stationed in the U.N.-
sponsored Republic of Korea* The decision was based on two
considerations which, in themselves, throw no small amount
of light on American strategic thinking:
1* The United States did not have sufficient military
-tMi^JKi^dZina *oa «sw ^Xr-
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Interest in defending the Republic of Korea and, in fact,
considered its defense a strategic liability.
2. The Bmvera shortage of U.S. military man-power
required the withdrawal of the Korean contingent.
Several factors determined President Truman *s deci-
sion (on the advice of the National Security Council) to
withdraw U.S. troops in the spring of 1949 and base the pro-
tection on indigenous security forces.
Since the United Nations had sponsored the new
Republic of Korea, it was apparently felt that the aegis of
that august organization would serve as a substitute for an
adequate defense force. Furthermore, the announcement of
the withdrawal of Soviet troops placed the onus squarely
upon the United States to follow suit. What U.S. policy-
makers apparently chose to ignore was the rapid build-up of
a large North Korean national army. The specific motive for
the failure of the United States to assist and encourage the
development of anything more than a skeleton South Korean
police force was partly a fear that such a force would pre-
cipitate action to unite the Koreas.
American statesmen and military leaders, at this time,
were outspoken in their declarations regarding American
strategic interests in the Far East. General KacArthur, at





the Korean peninsula in his delineation of the U.S. "line of
defense."
Secretary of State Acheson, at a speech before the
National Press Club in January, 1950, delineated the same
2
"defense perimeter" omitting Korea.
If these statements, coupled with the withdrawal of
American troops, were not an invitation to aggression, they
were at least a clear indication of an area of vulnerability
to a communist thrust. Statements such as those of hacArthur
and Acheson notwithstanding, the primary factor which should
have convinced the communists that they might attack the
Republic of Korea with impunity was the paucity of U.S.
ground forces relative to U.S. commitments. Critics of the
Korean policy of the United States have denied this fact on
the basis of the total U.S. forces making up the various
occupation and garrison forces throughout the world. What
these critics forget is that U.S. troop commitments were
heavy. It would not suffice to do as was done in Korea.
The communist threat was searching for an appropriate point
in the thin defenses of the peripheral strategic area of
Southeast Asia, which was bound to appear sooner or later,
1The New York Times , March 2, 1949, p. 22.
united States Department of State Bulletin xxil ,
January 23, 1950, pp. 115-116.
MM




Jji.fix- -d,: aov* .?•.. * no.
43n» i-jn.ic 3 . »«4rff
•tA-ioq f>.
44'X* ftiffa q <w+? * .. fto*ns>*4& «jbi-j »
•*4l ;*ooa lAOqq* J >cf n«* aisA
•qq «0£3I ,££
37
given the Inadequacy of forces relative to requirements*
The frequently-voiced U*s* intention to prepare to meet the
Soviets in a general war over Western Europe was a clear
enough index as to the priority of areas. General Mac-
Arthur *s testimony at the MacArthur hearings , in 1951, veri-
fied the lack of reserve troops*
The Soviet Union was fully justified in a conclusion
that the United States would be forced to accede to an
attack on the Republic of Korea by North Korean forces* Yet
when the attack occurred in June 1950, the United States
found sufficiently-compelling reasons to reverse its policy
and to intervene* The basis for this policy change is
probably the single-most interesting facet of the entire
conflict*
The basic reason for the decision to intervene in
Korea was one of fear* U*S* policymakers, using the analogy
of Nasi salami tactics of the late 1930 *s, feared that
acquiescence by the United States would lead shortly to a
similar threat elsewhere (probably in Southeast Asia) under
conditions more unfavorable than those in Korea* The con-
viction was that this "domino effect" would lead ultimately
to a confrontation with the Soviet Union in a total war*
United States Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on
Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in
the Far ^ast . 82nd Cong*, 1st Sesm* (Washington! Government
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Regardless of the Truman Administration's preoccupation with
total war, the Korean Intervention was tacitly following the
imperatives of a policy of containment in a gesture of na-
tional self-interest and supra-national idealism* On a
national self-interest basis, the United States was taking
an early stand in the interest of avoiding a more costly and
more painful confrontation later and perhaps closer to home*
Ideologically, the United States was assuming the posture of
tree world leadership in a crusade to resist communist world
domination*
The belief that U*S* intervention enjoyed United
Nations approval from its inception is incorrect* Purely
and simply, the United States was behaving like a great
power in unilaterally intervening over a violation of the
rights of the Republic of Korea* The sequence of events is
important* On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution (minus the boycotting Soviet
delegation) calling for an immediate end to the fighting and
the assistance of all members in restoring peace* On June
27a, following the communist defiance of this resolution,
the Security Council recommended that member nations assist
the Republic of Korea* On the first day of the resolution,
President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa
Straits* He also instructed General MacArthur to evacuate










while using the American naval and air cover. On June 26tfc,
in response to the increased military urgency of the situa-
tion, President Truman instructed MacArthur to use air and
naval forces in support of the Republic of Korea* Finally,
on June 30a, Truman authorised MacArthur to use the ground
forces in his command. Nonetheless, United Nations sanction
was eventually received, and the Korean Intervention took on
the color of an international crusade under the aegis of a
United Nations collective security action and the dominant
leadership of American forces. The eagerness displayed by
the United States in representing American intervention as
an altruistic act of pure collective security tended to
obscure the underlying basis of power politics without which




Before attempting to envision the Korean Intervention
as a model of containment, it would be well to observe the
factors which make it a rather unusual case. First, the
Republic of Korea had recently been established by free
elections under U.N. supervision and, therefore, recognised
as the lawful government south of the 38» parallel. Second,
the attack was an overt act of aggression in direct violation
4
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War—The Challenge to










of the U.N. Charter. Finally, the Soviet Union boycotted
the United Nations, thereby enabling the Security Council,
through a questionable legal maneuver, to pass a resolution
which otherwise could not have been passed. To anticipate
other communist probes to be equally unequivocal and clear-
cut would be an error* To base U.S. strategy upon such an
assumption would be unfortunate.
The Korean conflict raised understandable fears over
the problem of containing acts of lesser aggression by
limited war. This problem was not to be solved in terms of
Ideology or collective security. In fact, the unfortunate
choice of these media for cloaking U.S. motives tended to
cloud a proper evaluation of the lessons of Korea in terms
of the containment of future aggression. At the same time,
the disparity between the dictates of containment and the
traditional U.S. approach to war made the incident a rather
painful experiment for the American public in the unfamiliar
realm of power politics* The accompanying dismissal of
General MacArthur in April, 1951, ignited a debate over the
conduct of the Korean War which was both profound and re-
vealing in the degree to which it gives an insight into
American adjustment to the strategy of limited war. A
proper evaluation of the lessons of Korea, therefore, calls
for an appraisal of the conduct of the war as viewed by both
sides of the controversy over MacArthur's recall.
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The View of the Truman Administration
In his memoirs, President Truman identifies the over-
riding aim in the Korean Intervention as the prevention of a
Third World War. 5
The administration believed that the invasion of the
Republic of Korea was one of a series of probes sponsored by
the Soviet Union to determine the maximum feasible limits of
Soviet influence throughout the world* This tied in with
the second decisive consideration which was the fear of
over-commitment of forces in such a way as to make possible
a successful aggression elsewhere* The general belief,
therefore, was that Korea was a Soviet maneuver to involve
the United States as heavily as possible in Korea in order
to gain a free hand in Europe* An additional consideration
in U.S. policy had a marked effect upon the actual conduct
of the war* This was the preoccupation of the Truman Admin-
istration with the idea of maintaining good relations with
America's allies* It was, therefore, believed that Allied
unity required a certain deference to their wishes, as evi-
denced by forbidding air pursuit past the Yalu River, in the
interests of avoiding the risk of escalation* This particu-
lar consideration makes the Korean War a classic example of
5Harry S* Truman, Memoirs (New York; Ooubleday,
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the tacit limitation of the political objectives and the
effort to keep the military means in proportion with the
political objectives as the circumstances of the war
6
changed* The restrictions imposed by the United States
were:
1. The confinement of air and ground operations to
the limits of the Korean peninsula*
2. The withholding of the employment of Chinese
Nationalist troops*
3* The rejection of the proposal for a blockade of
the Chinese mainland*
In the first phase of the war, when U.N* forces were
on the defensive, the objectives were limited to the restora-
tion of peace and the recovery of the original border at the
38» parallel* This objective was announced in the U.N.
resolutions of June 25 and 27. Military operations north of
the 38tt parallel were restricted to the destruction of mili-
tary supplies. U.S. Air Force activity north of the 33tk
parallel was restricted to the confines of the Korean penin-
sula*
During the second phase of the war, when the U.N.
forces were able to take the initiative, the political
limitations were reappraised. As a result of this
6Osgood, op. clt . , p. 170.
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reappraisal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of
recommendations made by the National Security Council,
authorized MacArthur, at the time of the Inchon landings to
conduct ground operations north of the 38* parallel only if
there were no indication of direct Communist Chinese or
Soviet Russian intervention* After the success of the
Inchon landings, MacArthur was further authorized to destroy
the North Korean Army within Korea but, specifically, was
prohibited from using non-Korean ground forces along the
areas of the Chinese border and also from conducting air or
naval action against sources of North Korean supplies in
Manchuria* MacArthur failed to comply with the directive
restricting the use of non-Korean ground forces, informing
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such a limitation was not
militarily feasible* At this point, the political objective
of the war was altered to achieve the long-standing goal of
the Cairo Agreement of 1943 for a united Korea* Unable to
stand success, the General Assembly passed a resolution to
this effect* It was at this point that the Chinese People's
Republic Issued direct warnings against U*N. forces tres-
passing north of the 38* parallel* President Truman, with
MacArthur »s concurrence, chose to ignore these warnings,
taking pains to announce the new political objectives and to
warn the Chinese Communist Government that interference
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Chinese Communist forces entered the conflict in strength on
October 16, 1950. It was not until after HacArthur's unfor-
tunate announcement, on October 24, of "a general offensive'1
to have his troops home by Christmas, that the united States
7became fully aware of a massive Chinese offensive*
In the face of the Chinese offensive, the U.N. forces
retreated to a line south of the 38$ parallel. In January,
1951, General Ridgeway launched a limited offensive which
succeeded in re-achieving roughly the 38» parallel. At this
point, the Korean War turned into a stalemate and the Truman
Administration once again altered its political objectives.
Feeling that an extension of the war, at this point, would
involve a risk of total war, which would be entirely out of
proportion to the importance of the original objective, a
policy change was initiated. Secretary of State Acheson,
testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
June 26, 1951, let it be known that the United States would
be satisfied with the fulfillment of the original objective






United states Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Mutual Security Program , 82d Cong., 1st S«t*B,
(Washington: "Government Printing Office), pp. 24-25.
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Domestic politics exerted a great deal of pressure on
the decision-makers in Washington. During the 1952 Presiden-
tial campaign, the Republicans vowed to end the war in Korea,
reduce taxes, balance the budget, aid halt inflation* During
the campaign, charges were leveled at the incumbent Demo-
cratic Administration of waging a war in Korea without the
will to victory* Charges were further made that the hamper-
ing limitations imposed upon U.S. military commanders had
resulted in stalemates and constituted an ignominious form
of bartering with the enemy* There was strong pressure from
such congressional Jceyraen as Senators Knowland, Jenner,
Halone, and Taft for a firmer posture in Korea to stop the
threat of Asiatic Communism* The President disagreed with
these dissident voices* He estimated that an advance of
even ninety miles, to the narrow waist of the Korean penin-
sula, would cost about four billion dollars* Such an ad-
vance might well bring about a general war* As a result,
the concept of limited victory was espoused*
On July 28, 1953, a truce was signed at Panmunjon* No
South Korean signed it* The Korean Intervention had lasted
over thirty-seven months* American casualties were 33,629
dead and 103,284 wounded* The frontier was remarkably
similar to that of 1950* There had been no forced repatria-
tions* There had been no system of inspection established
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attack. The victory was limited
—
yet the purpose of the
9North Korean invasion had not been accomplished.
Certainly, the Koreans had failed in their first of-
fensive; and the Chinese, in turn, had failed to hurl the
Eighth Army into the sea. But the United States was the
greatest power in the world. Morally, then, America's non-
victory was, in fact, a defeat. In the same way, China's
non-defeat was a victory. Politically, this peace without
victory in a limited war marked a significant turning point
in the history of the twentieth century.
What, in summary, were the achievements of the Korean
intervention? By limiting the ends and the means of war and
by balancing political and military objectives in the light
of their effect on the scale of war and the risk of escala-
tion, the United States, with measured resistance, succeeded
in containing aggression short of total war. Had this been
the announced objective instead of a crusade to defeat Com-
munist aggression, the Korean experience would not have been
interpreted so bitterly by the American public. In the
light of the conduct of limited war, the Korean war was a
significant and praiseworthy achievement. Yet, the question
9Herbert Agar, The Price of Power t America Since
1945 (Chicago: The University of~Thicago Press, 1957), pp.
154^167.
Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, New York:






nsad <^Yfi. .. v ' oleics *jor:'-'.. : *-' • ... iibsic^ snJ <. ~;v-x^-h^i - .:. [.*. : JiUnu^i
'
47
has been raised whether the Truman Administration had con-
ducted the war in the most effective manner consistent with
the limitation of war and, further, whether those self-
imposed limitations were wise and consistent with the objec-
tives at stake* This is basically the question which was
aired in the public furor which followed the dismissal of
General MacArthur*
HacArthur'B View
After repeated evidence of an unwillingness to accept
the policies of President Truman for the conduct of the war;
and, after a series of public moves whereby he sought to
promote his own policies, General HacArthur was relieved of
his commands in Korea and Japan on April 10, 1951* This
action keyed off a furious controversy in the united States
and culminated in a Senate investigation of MacArthur 1 s
recall and the Par Eastern situation during Hay and June of
1951. What was interesting in the controversy was that both
sides advocated a limited war.
MacArthur's advocated objectives were:
1* To stop aggression in Korea*
2* To secure a cease-fire agreement*
3* To negotiate a settlement consistent with the U*N*
objective of a unified Korea*









General MacArthur opposed unlimited military measures
to achieve these objectives. He opposed the engagement of
Communist Chinese ground forces on the mainland outside the
Korean peninsula. MacArthur proposed, in the pursuit of his
objectives, the bombing of Manchurian airfields, a blockade
of the Chinese coast, and the employment of Chinese Nation-
alist forces in Korea and South China. He contended that
these measures, if adopted, would achieve the limited objec-
tives of the U.N. more quickly, with fewer casualties, and
with less risk of escalating the conflict into a general
war. If these measures were not adopted, General MacArthur
proposed two other ways of limiting the war as alternatives
to total defeat. The first alternative, made in the early
stages of the war, was an armistice on the basis of the 38tt
parallel. The second alternative, made in the last stage of
12the war, was a complete withdrawal from Korea.
The basis for the controversy was the difference of
view concerning the three principal measures advocated by
MacArthur. This difference arose from divergent estimates
of their military advantage and of the risk of escalation
and the overcommitment which they entailed. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff did not dispute the military advantage of
MacArthur «s proposals. They did maintain, however, that the











adoption of these measures would expand the war and increase
the risk of total war without giving any commensurate assur-
ance of a quicker and less costly military decision*
The crux of the public appeal KacArthur's proposals
exerted in the United States was that he had made a strong
case for the public impression of what kind of a war it was.
Probably the best summation of the whole issue was made by
General Bradley:
So long as we regarded the Soviet Union as the
main antagonist and western Europe as the main
prize, [the proposals made by General MacArthur]
would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong time,
at the wrong place, and with the wrong enemy* *3
Using the same rhetoric, Secretary of State Acheson
expressed the fear that MacArthur • s proposals would seriously
elevate the ultimate risk of involving the United States in
the "wrong war" but with "the right enemy," the Soviet Union,
in any of several possible courses of Soviet intervention
14
varying from volunteer troops to an all-out war* A final
major difference of views existed in MacArthur *s disinterest
in the importance of Allied unity*
The differences in view cited above implied a deeper
and more serious misconception, on MacArthur' s part, of the










meaning and conduct of limited war. His understandable ob-
session with total victory ("in war, there is no substitute
for victory*) was basically antithetical to the entire con-
cept of the limitation of means and ends. The Truman Admin-
istration entered, fought, and ended the Korean War for
political objectives, which took precedence over the conduct
of battle* MacArthur, on the other hand, regarded the whole
purpose of war ass
• . • destroying the enemy *s military power and bring-
ing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum
of time and with a minimum of loss* 15
The ironic aspect of the whole controversy was that Mac-
Arthur *s views agreed more closely with the guiding ideals
which the Truman Administration had established for the war,
than the Administration itself* The Administration had,
quite naturally, been forced to make a tacit qualification
of these guiding ideals by considering strategic priorities
16
and the relation between commitments and available power*
The Lessons of Korea
The foremost lesson of the Korean Intervention is
that it demonstrated that the United States could success-
fully resist direct military aggression, locally, by limited










war in the secondary strategic areas, where a demonstrated
capacity for local resistance was the only effective deter-
17
rent to communist military aggression* Although U.S.
intervention in Korea struck an effective blow for the con-
tainment of communist aggression, it also incurred some
fairly serious drawbacks. The United States permitted the
Chinese People's Republic to gain considerable prestige
among the smaller nations of Asia, while at the same time
raising doubts among those nations as to the ability of the
U.S. to defend them. At the same time, the United States
committed itself to the defense of a strategically profit-
less area in a difficult political environment. The ques-
tion of whether or not the United states, by pursuing a
harder policy, could have done better may forever remain
unanswered. However, a proper evaluation of the lessons of
Korea demands at least an attempt to answer several tren-
chant questions.
The first question regards the U.S. estimate of the
risk of involving Soviet Russia in a general war. rfas the
Truman Administration's cost-risk calculation valid. The
fear of escalation was the chief reason for the stringent
limitations placed on U.S. military action by the Adminis-
tration. It would appear, in retrospect, that the U.S.
17Osgood, op . cit • , p. 178.
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calculation was in error. It is highly unlikely that tha
Soviet Union would have allowed itself to be drawn directly
into the war except in response to a direct attack on Soviet
territory* This conclusion is generally concurred in by
U.S. intelligence reports and the ex post facto analyses of
U.S. senior military commanders in the Far £ast. The con-
clusion is logical in an over-all view of the situation
including the existence of a nuclear monopoly by the United
States.
A second, rather obvious, question deals with the
estimate by the United States Government of the danger of
overcommitment. Aside from the threat of total war, the
Truman Administration was governed by a fear that over-
commitment of American troops in Korea would expose a more
strategic area of U.S. national interests to a communist
probe. It is considered a legitimate estimate and the con-
servative policy of the Administration was well Justified by
the woeful unpreparedness of the United States for limited
war in 1949. It is true that the Chinese Communist ground
forces were at near maximum effort, given the current level
of Soviet material support. However, 80 per cent of the
effective armed forces of the United States were tied up in
Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York:
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the Korean campaign. If any lesson can be drawn, it is that
the containment of communist aggression along a 20,000 mile
defense perimeter will require a limited war capability far
19greater than that possessed by the United States in 1949.
A third, and rather searching, question concerns the
decision to cross the 38t* parallel and to expand the politi-
cal objectives to the unification of Korea* Some people, it
is said, just cannot stand success* The decision to expand
the objectives has been bemoaned by many an expert, includ-
ing George Kennan* From a legal standpoint, the new objec-
tive had a sound basis. But from a political and military
standpoint, it did not* Taking into consideration the
military unpreparedness , the low priority of Korea, the risk
of escalation, and the dangers of overcommitment, It is felt
that the decision was unfortunate. W* W* Rostow expressed
it very aptly*
Whatever more mature considerations were brought
to bear on national policy, it was a simple, univer-
sally understandable truth that the nation had
gambled, its bluff had been called, and it had not
backed its play. 20
A final question deals with the concern expressed by
the Truman Administration, in its conduct of the war, for
19Osgood, op . cit.
, pp* 182-183*
20v
w. W. Rostow, The United states in the World Arena
(New Yorki Harpers, 19*577, p. 241.
tl
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the maintenance of Allied unity. Had the U*3* deference to
its Allies been as great as critics claim, it is doubtful
that the U.S. would have decided to intervene in Korea with
such celerity* There is nothing to suggest that the United
States refrained from taking any measures that would have
substantially affected the course of the war on account of
the views of its Allies* The decision to intervene unilat-
erally was made without prior consultation* There is no
reason to conclude that it was a serious factor in the con-
duct of the war* From a purely political viewpoint, Allied
unity was important but not vital* The United States,
together with the Republic of Korea, bore over 90 per cent
21
of the burden of the war*
It is understood that some aspects of these questions
are yet unclear and unresolved and all of them are subject
to some degree of conjecture* However, if the United states
is to gain from the lessons of Korea, it is through serious
consideration of these four questions that the learning
process is begun*
The lessons taught by Korea were to affect the for-
eign policy of the Soviet Union as well* The Korean War was
a logical extension of Stalin's policy, clearly tested in
Europe* Balked in Europe and frustrated in its progress
21







elsewhere, this policy was applied in Asia by escalating the
Cold War to violence. The real motivation for the attack on
Korea was to test the tenacity of the principle of contain-
ment in a place inconvenient for the United States and under
conditions different from any earlier application of the
22doctrine. Containment, even in Asia, was found to have
teeth.
22Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War and After
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: £rentice-Hal I ,"" r^cT* "p. 99.
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CHAPTER IV
VICT HAH—A SECOND CASE STUDY
The war, in which the United States is currently in-
volved in Viet Nam, has been labeled, by Bernard Fall, the
Second Indochina War* It began by deliberate communist
design in 1957; and, abetted by American fumbling, it spread
to Laos in 1959* Under the direction of the Johnson Admin-
istration, a signal change in the complexion of the war, as
well as the degree of U*3« involvement, occurred in February,
1965, with the introduction of escalation as a policy* At
the time of this writing, escalation has continued, with an
unsuccessful pause, to the point of deep air interdiction
raids to within a few miles of Hanoi*
A brief summary of events leading up to the beginning
of the Second Indochina War is useful* The movement for
Vietnamese independence was strongly influenced by the cata-
lytic effect of Japanese domination during World War II*
The break, in French domination of Indochina, provided by
the war and by French weakness, was the single-most impor-
tant factor which spelled the beginning of the end of French
colonialism in Southeast Asia* The attempt to restore
Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Hams . A Political and
rks Frederick A* Praeger, 1963),Military Analysis (Hew YoT
p* 316*
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French influence, in 1945, found the incipient seeds of re-
sistance already planted, which blossomed, in 1946, into the
First Indochina War. This war lasted until 1954* The re-
sistance war period was one of all-out revolution to achieve
national independence for all three regions of Viet Nasi,
under Viet Minn control* The denial, by Viet Kinh leader-
ship, of any links between international communism and the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nan, obtained for then the
widest possible international support in the struggle to
overthrow French domination* The nationalist pose struck by
Ho Chi Kinh was an essential part of this strategy*
Two factors in 1949 and 1950 caused a significant
change in Viet Kinh strategy* The first was the victory of
Mao Tse Tung in China in 1949, which brought a friendly com-
munist regime to the Tonkinese border* The second factor
was the partially successful attempt by the French to in-
stall the Bao Dai regime in power* This was basically an
effort to woo the forces of nationalism away from the Viet
Kinh camp*
The first factor mentioned above enabled a gradual
2
shift from "stage one to stage two*" This stage of revolu-
tionary war saw Viet Minh forces taking an occasional
Ellen J* Hammer. The .Struggle for Indochina (Stan-
fords Stanford university Press, 1^54), pp. 292-293.
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tactical initiative in the form of local counter-offensives
against the French forces. The stages of revolutionary war
were formulated earlier by Giap Long and were: defense,
3
equilibrium, and offense.
The second factor, that of the threat of the Bao Dai
regime, resulted in a definite change in the complexion of
the Viet Minh movement from a nationalist to a communist
character. This was a grave tactical error in that the Viet
Minh ran afoul of the newly-formulated U.S. policy of con-
4tainment.
After more than seven years of military operations,
the Viet Minh achieved partial success from the Geneva
Accords of 1954, whose terms were as much a result of inter-
national forces as of the battlefield decision of Dien Bien
Phu.
U.S. Involvement
The first U.S. contacts with Ho Chi Minh were in
1944-1945 through O.S.S. agents in China. The psychological
3Bert Cooper et ^al. , Case Studies in Insurgency and
Revolutionary Warfare i Viet Nam 1941-19"5T""( Washington
:""
Special Operations Research Office, The American University,
1964), p. 82. Ellen Hammer points out in the previous foot-
note, that although the revolutionaries talked a great deal
about it, they never accomplished the transition into stage
three
.
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effect of early U.S. military support (oriented againat the
Japanese) was probably of greater Importance than its mill*
5tary effect.
As early as the summer of 1949, Secretary of State
Acheson categorically gave warning to the Chinese People *s
Republic regarding aggression against her Southeast Asian
neighbors. The prompt recognition , extended by the United
states to the Bao Dai regime, on February 7, 1950, though
perhaps ill advised, was a further step in her involvement
in Southeast Asia. In a show of support for the Bao Dai
government, two American warships dropped anchor off Saigon
in March, 1950. In Kay of the same year, Secretary of State
Acheson announced the commencement of U.S. military and
economic aid "to restore security and develop genuine nation-
7
alism in Indochina. " In December, the Vietnamese Government
was invited to San Francisco, as a further gesture of recog-
nition, to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. During this
period, Ngo Dinh Diem was enjoying political exile and the
hospitality of the Keryknoll Fathers in New Jersey.
U.S. involvement gradually deepened, and its aid to
Cooper, op . cit.
, pp. 106-7.
£
Hammer, op . cit .. p. 267. Quoted from the United
states Departmentof State, United states Relations with
China , p. xxvli.













Vict Mam increased. By 1954, the United states was paying
more than 80 par cant of all French military expenditures in
jndochina. The aid, which began in 1950 » averaged five
hundred million dollars annually and was delivered directly
to the French under the supervision <tf the U,5« Military
Assistance Advisory Group*
This enormous U*S* investment , in Indochina* indi-
cates a decisive change in policy towards Southeast Asia*
<Witness the previous statement by Achaean.) The indlffer-
independence had perhaps contributed to the present situa-
tion in that beleaguered country* How, by 1954, a massive
shift in U*S* policy was in full force and would continue in
strength and militancy until, in 1555, it would constitute a
serious threat to world peace and security*
Two dates signaled the end of French influence in
Southeast Asia and the beginning of serious U*S. involvement!
September 29, 1954, and April 26, 1956* The dates mark, re-
spectively, the end of French military and political pros-
i* French disengagement was rapid and total* The
problem of the two Viet Nans—Hcrth and South— was now the
9
exclusive burden and responsibility of the united States*









Problems of Limited War in Viet Nam
The alacrity with which the United States assumed the
burden in Viet Nam was, unfortunately, not matched by any
real awareness of the issues at stake. The major problem,
and a basic one, was conceptual. The belief that the United
States was dealing with the last, hard-core remnants of Viet
Minn activity was still widely held by many U.S. military
men as late as 1958.
In actual fact, a gradual but massive build-up had
been going on for several years. As a result of this error,
it became necessary for the Kennedy Administration to report
huge infiltration estimates, out of proportion to what was
reasonably occurring.
Between 1959 and the summer of 1964, as many as
34,300 guerrillas infiltrated South Viet Nam from the North.
Of the total, 19,000 were "confirmed" and 15,300 "probables."
The annual flow of confirmed infiltrators grew from 1,800 in
1959 and 1960 to 3,700 in 1961 and further to 5,800 in 1962.
In 1963, the number decreased slightly, to about 4,00Q, but
has increased ever since then. During the first seven
months of 1964, the figures rose to 4,000 confirmed and
Hammer, o£. clt . t pp. 324-325. Admiral Stump,
Commander in Chief, Pacific, was quoted in March, 1958,
before a Congressional Committee, as saying that the Viet-




6,000 probables . By simple extrapolation, a yearly figure
11
of 20,000 could be expected.
One of the most serious problems of the war in Viet
Nam, to date, is the failure of the United States to abs^mb
fully the socio-political situation in South Viet Nam for
what it really is* Although the limited use of force in
U.S. foreign policy has, by now, been accepted as nothing
more than a military or para-military adjunct to what is
essentially a political power maneuver, the real nature of
the political unrest in South Viet Nam has never been fully
assessed or appreciated*
The revolution presently in progress in South Viet
Nam should not be confused with the Hanoi-directed insur-
gency, despite Communist efforts to take credit for it.
Insurgency certainly contributed to the climate in which the
revolution was nurtured—but the two movements are not the
It should be noted that the present program of insur-
gency is nothing more than the latest phase of a forty-year
Time . February 5, 1965. These figures were quoted
from a Defense Department release on an intelligence report,
The high percentage of probables and the impossibility of
checking figures permits adjustment to accommodate for
errors which this writer feels were made in U*S. military
estimates of the Vietnamese situation prior to 1958.
Bernard Fall, in op. cit • , questions the accuracy of offi-








campaign waged by the In ^-Chinese Communist iarty to
acquire complete political control over all Viet Nam, hege-
mony over Laos and some form of control over Cambodia* The
various forms which this campaign has taken, as well as the
labels under which it has be^n advertised, have successfully
deceived the Vietnamese people and foreign observers as well.
In the same vein, U.S* policymakers appear to have b^mn
taken in*
The Communists took full advantage of the disorder of
the Diem regime and its successors* It has concentrated on
the South Vietnamese peasantry against urban-oriented Saigon
regimes* The revolution sterna from a deep-seated regional-
ism which the Viet Cong have successfully exploited and a
strong nationalism which, prior to 1954, successively ex-
pressed itself against French and Japanese repression*
The important fact is that what is going on in South
Viet Nam is a revolution. This revolution is being ex-
ploited by the North Vietnamese government. The revolution
involves a quest for Vietnamese answers to Viet Nam's police-
cal problems* Mo solutions could be less Vietnamese, nor
more alien to basic Vietnamese traditions than those offered
by Communist doctrine* communism is doctrinally committed
to the abolition of the two basic Vietnamese social institu-
tions^—extended family and private property. Furthermore,
Hanoi's Communism is under direct Chinese patronage and
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opposition to Chinese domination is one of the great con-
tinuing themes of Vietnamese history.
The fact that the political unrest in South Viet Nam
is based on local problems (exacerbated by North Vietnamese
insurgency) explains the inability of U.S. policy to produce
political stability there. The apparent support given to
the Viet Cong by the South Vietnamese peasantry, which is
the keystone to recent Viet Cong successes, is bitterly
frustrating to the American military effort and to the
American people. This frustration points up the continuing
belief in the United States that the solution to all prob-
lems lies in the military defeat of the North Vietnamese
campaign of insurgency.
If South Viet Nam's real revolution does not destroy
the country first, it may, in the long run, be the eventual
undoing of Communist ambitions and produce a real national
12
entity where none has previously existed.
Another conceptual error was what Bernard Fall calls
13the "Korean Trauma." MAAG commanders and other military
advisers trained, organized, and prepared for another Korean
type war. Considering the distinct lack of North Korean
12George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in







success in 1951, it should have been clear that an overt act
of aggression was the least likely possibility in Viet Nam.
In April, 1962, General 0* Daniel, an earlier MAAG commander,
described the South Korean Army as "eight well-organised and
well-trained divisions with supporting weapons suitable for




A third area of misconception was the belief, of U.S.
military advisers, that external defense was divorced from
internal security* U.S.-trained internal security forces
were better trained and equipped to handle minor civil dis-
orders than to cope with a massive infiltration by dedicated,
hard-core regulars. The American military officers, evaluat-
ing Viet Nam* s internal security problems used the same
criteria as did the Frenc Generals Carpentier, Salan, and
Navarre. The United States had learned little from the sad
experience of its predecessors in Viet Nam*
Following an American tendency to over-compensate,
American defense officials allowed the need for COIN
(counter-insurgency) forces to become almost obsessive* In
all of this fixation with Special forces, spatial arms,
equipment, aircraft and techniques, there ran the threat of
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nan, were equating firepower with manpower* This approach
was made fairly in the teeth of overwhelming French experi-
ence to the contrary* The fact remains that "jungle war ia
a war of highly trained specialists where the actual man and
15
minor infantry tactics are dominant.
A review of the manpower experiences of the French in
Viet Nam is revealing* In Hay, 1947, French Minister of Mar
Paul Coste-Floret stated that Viet Nam was kept well under
control by an expeditionary force of 115,000 men* However,
he added, it would easily require 500,000 men to undertake
16the conquest of Indochina*
In 1955, the Viet Minh Army, including regulars,
regional troops and local militia numbered somewhere between
300,000 and 400,000* Opposing this force were some 420,000
troops of the French Union* The Vietnamese Army, at the end
17
of 1953, numbered some 200,000 men* The inadequacy of
this ratio became painfully obvious the following year* The
balance sheet should be of interest to U*3« policymakers*
After seven years of fighting in Indochina, the total cost
15James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows » The
Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War TTTew Vork: T5oubleday,ismr —it.





to France was sixteen hundred billion francs, twice the
18
total Marshall Plan aid, and ninety thousand casualties.
U.S. expenditures in South Viet Nam since 1954 have
been considerable* Economic aid alone, between 1954 and
1965, exceeded S2, 000, 000, 000 for a country numbering less
19
than 16,000,000 inhabitants.
As of Hay, 1965, total U.S. troops in Viet Nam num-
bered 46,000. In view of the above figures, the U.S. /French
troop ratio becomes an interesting commentary on U.S. politi-
cal and military thinking as well as an indication of the
possible cost of continued U.S. involvement in Viet Nam.
Tactics in Viet Nam
—a—
—
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Only a brief overview of military tactics is attempted
in this paper. On the Viet Cong (an abbreviation for Viet-
namese Communist) side, the main techniques applied are
terrorism, political indoctrination, and guerrilla warfare.
Obviously, the Viet Cong are still functioning in Stage Two
of Giap*s stages of revolutionary war.
Terrorism took the form of assassination, first of
the local chieftains, then of school teachers, then social
18
Ibid., p. 297. A quote from a speech made by
President Auriol in 1952.
19Lyndon 3. Johnson, speech on "U.S. Foreign Policy,"
May 13, 1965. Printed in The New York Times , May 13, 1965.
2 The New York Times . May 23, 1965.
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workers and, finally, American adviser*. At the time of
Admiral Stump •a comment ifn» 10, supra , p. 61) local chiefs
were being assassinated at the rate of ten per day* From
1961 to 1963, over 13,000 heads of villages were murdered*
The technique of assassination proved to be tremen-
dously effective not only as a technique for terrorism but
also in contributing to the social, cultural, and adminis-
trative breakdown of the rural populace* By this means, a
vital link between the government and the vast rural segment
was broken* This fact alone should have started bells ring-
ing all over Washington* However, it initially received
notice more as a problem of internal security rather than a
huge communist attack at the very cohesion of the South Viet
Nam government*
Viet Cong political indoctrination was carried out
through the intense indoctrination received by the 90,000
who emigrated to North Viet Nam and later returned as
agents*
Guerrilla warfare, as practiced by the Viet Cong, is
neither new nor particularly sophisticated* A review of the
textbooks of Hao Tse Tung and his predecessor, Sun Tsu, show
very little change in two thousand years* What is signifi-
cant about the Viet Cong variety of guerrilla warfare is its
21
















conservative character* There are few, if any, occasions in
which Viet Cong troops were unnecessarily exposed in combat.
Despite South Vietnamese and U.S. reports to the contrary,
the estimates of Viet Cong killed are suspect* The glaring
disparity between the numbers claimed dead and the weapons
recovered seem to bear this out* It is felt that these
battle estimates probably include a good number of civilian
dead*
U»s» Tactics
The familiar pattern of economic aid, then military
aid, followed by technicians, military advisers, pilots, and
troops to guard U.S* facilities «~id personnel appears in
Viet Nam* The culmination, which occurred in the spring of
1965, was the use of U*S* troops in the field*
Internal security problems were approached using
techniques neither new nor very successful* The strategic
hamlet idea was tried out by the French in 1953 in Indochina
as well as by the British in Malaya* Essentially, it is a
technique for cutting the local populace off from the re-
sistance forces, thereby preventing terrorism, on the one
hand, and aid and assistance, voluntary or otherwise, by the
populace, on the other. The strategic hamlet is a heavily-
fortified village* The methods are usually primitive using
such things as bamboo abatis, and so forth* It was observed,
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that there still reigned in Viet Nam
• • • a subtle feeling that the population has not
yet really committed itself to the hamlet idea*
Nothing is more important at present than the hamlet
program • • • • Americans frankly acknowledge that
they have few alternatives if it fails to cure our
present ills. 22
But* the Americans did have an alternative, or at
least a modification, called the Delta Plan* On March 22,
1962, Operation Sunshine set in motion the Delta Plan which
literally moved the entire village into a prepared, fortified
and usually more strategically defensible location* Mili-
tarily, the Delta Plan, so called from its location in the
rich Mekong River delta area, was an improvement* From any
other standpoint-—agriculturally, socially, economically,
and so forth—the Delta Plan has been a failure* Villagers
simply did not want to be uprooted* Many were moved only at
gunpoint* A scorched earth policy was followed in the old
village site* Whatever else the Delta Plan did, it invoked
even greater hardship upon an already beleaguered populace*
The classic hunt-and-kill operation, with thousands
of troops sealing off an area, and then systematically
mopping up, has been the mainstay of the Vietnamese and
American forces* It is, more often than not, a frustrating
and unproductive technique*















A new dimension was added to the war in Southeast
Asia when the United States acknowledged on January 13,
1965, that two U.S. Air Force bombers had been shot down in
a raid over Laos* The disclosure was the first public ad-
mission that U.S. forces were engaged in attacks on Commu-
nist supply lines outside South Viet Nam. The jets were
reportedly participating in an air strike of more than
twenty U.S. airplanes which destroyed a key Laotian bridge
along the Communist supply route from North Viet Nam. On
January 18, the same day that President Johnson made his
Defense message to Congress, the Department of State de-
clared that U.S. forces were assisting Laos to defend its
neutrality and independence, as guaranteed by the 1962
23Geneva Accord.
In February, 1965, another development was added to
the war in Viet Nam. As a direct result of North Vietnamese
torpedo boat attacks on U.S. naval vessels patrolling the
Gulf of Tonkin and further attacks on U.S. installations in
South Viet Nam, the United States commenced air attacks on
North Viet Nam. The attacks were measured—increasing in
magnitude and targetting as well as proximity to Hanoi.
This new dimension, called escalation, was first
officially articulated in a White House news statement on
&nolM
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February 7, 1965, the day of the first air strike* Follow*
ing a meeting of the National Security Council, the state-
ment was released indicating that the air attacks had been
"carefully limited to military areas" which "intelligence
has shown to be actively used by Hanoi for training and
infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet Nam*"
The statement emphasised that "we seek no wider war" but it
added that "whether or not this course can be maintained
lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors*" The Soviet
Union had been fully informed of the limited nature and
24intent of the air strikes*
On the sane day, President Johnson stated at a news
conference regarding the evacuation of dependents from
Saigon
i
It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more
aggressive course of action against both South Viet-
namese and American installation • • « • tfe have no
choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely
clear our continued determination to back South Viet
Nam. 25
Troop reinforcements were ordered into action that
same day* In addition, U.S. Hawk missile units were ordered
to South Viet Nam. The pattern of deeper and deeper mill-
tary involvement was rapidly unfolding* The Secretary of
24White House news statement, quoted in the Conqres*








Defense, at a press conference on the same day as the Viet
Cong attack at Pleiku, called its
• • • a clear challenge of the political purpose of
both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Governments*
• • • which we could not fail to respond to • • .
without misleading the North Vietnamese as to our
intent and the strength of our purpose to carry out
that intent. 26
In the furor which followed the new policy, the term
"escalation" was attached by Senator Mansfield in a sharply
worded criticism of U.S. foreign policy.
The concept of escalation was formulated to dissuade
the Hanoi Government from continuing the subversion, infil-
tration, and guerrilla warfare against South Viet Nam. It
is true that the original intent of the air attacks was
keyed to retaliation to North Vietnamese initiatives. How-
ever, the air attacks shortly assumed the higher strategic
purpose of escalation. The United States made it clear that
it was willing to cease the air attacks upon receipt of an
indication that the North Vietnamese had desisted from their
subversion of South Viet Nam*
During the House Armed Services Committee hearings
from February 18-24, 1965, Secretary of 0&£*n** McNamara
articulated the policy of the Johnson Administration regard-
ing South Viet Nam. He pointed out that the stakes in Viet















to the control of Communist China* A Communist victory in
South Viet Nam has wider significance than that* one of the
most meaningful facts of international affairs today is the
close inter-relation between the U*S*-soviet detente rnd the
Slno-Soviet rift. A Communist success in Viet Nam would be
a signal vindication of the Chinese position in the dispute
with Soviet Union for leadership in Asia. Carried further,
a strengthening of the Chinese position vis-d-vls the
smaller "third areas" of Asia could do nothing but diminish
the U*s.-Soviet accord* HcNamara stated:
Thus the choice is not simply whether to continue our
efforts to keep South Viet Nam free and independent
but, rather, whether to continue our struggle to halt
Communist expansion in Asia* If the choice is the
latter, as I believe it should be, we will be far
better off facing the issue 1 a South Viet Nam* The
present situation in South Viet Nam is grave but by
no means hopeless* *'
During early April, 1965, President Johnson made an
offer of unconditional discussions which was summarily
rejected by both the Peking and Hanoi governments:
Hanoi has clung to its demand—which Washington re-
jects—that any negotiations must have as their basis
American withdrawal from Viet Nam* Peking has ada-
mantly opposed any settlement short of total American
capitulation. 2e
27Secretary of Defense Robert strange McNamara,
Statement before the united States Congress, House, Armed
Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense
Program and the 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965*
287he New York Times , May 23, 1965*
t. .
J* Aowaeitoi.




On Hay 13, 1965, a new tactic was unveiled, called
"the pause." It was a six-day cessation of air attacks,
svade on the initiative of the United states to see if the
North Vietnamese could be brought to the conference table.
This tactic was unsuccessful, and the air attacks were re-
sumed on May 19 from bases in Thailand, South Viet Nam, and
also from three U.S. aircraft carriers operating off Indo-
china.
The institution of the pause received considerable
coverage and support in the U.S. as well as abroad, espe-
2°
cially while it was in effect. In retrospect, however, it
is clear that it was simply a maneuver to quiet the more
influential of the U.S. legislators ; such as, Senator Ful-
bright, who voiced the desire for a cessation in the U.S.
air strikes for the purpose of improving the climate for
negotiations
•
Jround action also increased in intensity. The U.S.-
South Vietnamese tactic of hunt-and-klll has been stream-
lined with the incorporation of heliborne techniques. Quick
penetrations are accomplished with the aid of troop-carrying
helicopters escorted by helicopters armed with rockets and
heavy automatic weapons. In late Kay, this technique
yielded several moderately successful operations.
'"Pause In Viet Nam," an editorial in The New York
















Escalation, as a tactic, is not limited to air war-
fare. In perhaps a less spectacular way, U.S. troop involve-
ment has oeen escalating in both magnitude and in the degree
of participation in the fighting. In 1961, U.S. troops in
Viet Nam totaled two thousand and functioned mainly in a
security role, guarding U.S. personnel, materiel, and in-
stallations. The following troop totals show a significant
30








The troop level figure which is now under discussion
is 125,000 men and was confirmed in a White House news
release August 4, 1965. This figure is reportedly the
Defense department objective for the foreseeable future.
This statement is interesting when it is noted that, in
March, General Taylor announced to Congress that the figure
of 30,000 would be an outside top for the Vietnamese opera-
tion. On the very next day, a Pentagon news release
31
announced a build-up to 40,000.
1*S£ U£L York Times . Kay 23, 1965.
31>Kow Many Are Needed.
,
n an editorial in The Wash-
ington Post . May 29, 1965.
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It Is worth noting that the United States, at this
moment, is far from equaling the French troop involvements
in 1953. The two great equalizers, it is alleged, are
American air power and the American soldier* mile this
writer is willing to acknowledge a possible, nay probable,
superiority in fighting qualities of the present American
fighting man over the French soldier of ten years ago, it is
difficult to accept an order of magnitude of ten to one*
Even at that, the French effort was a monumental failure*
Total French involvement, at the time of the fall of
Oien Bien Phu, was 420,000 moiim The United States, in its
last ground commitment in Asia, the Korean War, was forced
to put in over 327,000 troops before being able to force the
Communist forces into accepting a cease-fire. Where numbers
were not the controlling factor in the case of the French in
Viet Nam, they were able to count for the United States in
Korea, "ased upon the present militant stand of the Johnson
Administration in Southeast Asia, there is no reason to
believe that U.S. troop involvement will not continue to
escalate beyond that of Korea.
Estimates of the ultimate U.S. troop commitment in
32Viet Nam are as numerous as they are futile. However,
Surrey Harder, "U.S. Strategy in Viet war," The
Washington ?ost , July 18, 1965. For example, Mr. Harder
estimates a top figure of 150,000 to 200,000 men* This is
somewhat higher than current Defense Department estimates.
fctfl mil
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there are some cold hard facts to be considered in the Viet-
namese situation in relation to larger-scale and more con-
ventional military operations as the North Vietnamese
strategy advances into ->tage Three* The North Vietnamese
33Army numbers over 400,000 regular troops* The Hanoi
government is in a position, if sufficiently supported by
.nraunist Chinese supplies and equipment, successfully to
commit this force to the field against the South Vietnamese
and American troops in a more conventional military confron-
tation*
The strategy of escalation, implemented by the
Johnson Administration, consists of two stages* Stage One,
in this strategy, was the decision, carried out in February,
1965, to begin air strikes north of the 17u> parallel* stage
Two is the build-up of U*S. troops in the newly-formulated
role of active combat participation to a force in excess of
100,000 men* The decision to enter Stage Two, to commit
U*S. forces as front-line fighters, is one of the more
34
significant steps in the policy of escalation*
The Lessons of Viet Nam
Many lessons have been derived from the war in Viet
33James Reston, "Unlimited Snds and Limited Means,"
The New York Times , June 6, 1965*
34Rowland £vans and Robert Novak, ''Stage Two in Viet
Nam ." The Washington Post . July 19, 1965*
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to date, Kany more have yet to be learned. Nonetheless,
one lesson is abundantly clear. The united States has a
"stake" in Viet Nam. This stake is not whether the United
States is capable of defeating 40,000 guerrillas with heli-
copters, weed-killing chemicals, napalm, or non-toxic gas;
nor is the key problem whether the limited escalation tactic
will work even when backed up with tactical nuclear weapons
and launched against Hanoi. There need be no questioning
whether or not the United States has the power to defeat the
North Vietnamese forces. The real question is whether the
United States and the West are still able to instill enough
confidence in those humble Vietnamese who have put their
trust in us, to make them stand up *nd fight for the common
cause. If they do, it will only be because they are finally
convinced that the defeat of the North Vietnamese government
does not mean an unconditional return to the bondage of a
35















LIMITED WAR—CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR
No discussion of limited war would be complete with-
out at least a mention of the question of the use of nuclear
weapons* Probably the clearest statement made, of the
feelings of a large segment of the American public regarding
the use of tactical nuclear weapons, was by Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric in October, 1961:
I, for one, have never believed in a so-called
limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you
build a limit into it once you start using any
kind of nuclear bang. 1
The point is very clearly brought to the attention of
all the writers of material on current nuclear strategy that
one of the most significant facts about the limited nuclear
2
war is that one has never been fought. The tendency is for
these analysts of nuclear strategy to attribute to society,
in general, a degree of rationality during a nuclear holo-
caust which, so far, it has not demonstrated under conditions
far less terrifying. Halperin's observation, above, becomes
Henry L. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," from
Ralph Toledano (ed.), Conservative Papers (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).
2Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age













all the more meaningful in that It renders many of the basic
premises of the nuclear stratgists purely conjectural.
As these analysts weigh all the possibilities and
speculate on the form that nuclear war might take, nowhere
do they take into consideration the effect of mass shock on
a society and on people who govern—a subject of which
3physicians know little and physicists know less.
The use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war,
if not openly advocated, is at least included in its general
consideration. Tactical nuclear weapons appear in the
weapons inventories of both the Soviet Union and the United
States. Their use has long ago been conceived, argued, and
accepted in American military thinking. This acceptance,
however, has not been without its opponents.
In the spring of 1959, a three-star admiral committed
one of the most significant politico-military heresies yet
confessed by a man in uniform. Vice-Admiral Brown, recent
Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet stated:
I have no faith in the so-called controlled use of
atomic weapons. I would not recommend the use of
any atomic weapon, no matter how small, when both
sides have the power to destroy the world. 4
3S. L. A. Marshall, "Global Game Called Risk-Taking,
"
The New York Times Book Review , Kay 30, 1965, p. 3. This
argument was made in a book review of Herman Kahn, On Esca-
lation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
4Hanson W. Baldwin, "Limited War," The Atlantic
Monthly , June, 1959, p. 35. Admiral Brown's comments were
18
.
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The Admiral 1 s comments voiced the thoughts of many
other serious analysts of national security policy* These
people feel that the thesis outlined in the writings of men
like Henry Kissinger tend to over-simplify the problems of
limited war. The general thesis of Kissinger's is that the
United States must be able to fight and win nuclear wars.
The superiority in size of Soviet ground forces at the time
of publication of his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy
,
prompted the formulation of the idea that a smaller
U.S. force, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons could
more than suffice in a confrontation with the Soviets. Un-
fortunately, the Soviets began a similar modernization of
their ground forces. Roger Hillsraan generally exploded
Kissinger's thesis by stating:
There is nothing to indicate that a good, big
atomic army would not be able to defeat a good
little atomic army .5
The articulation of the possibility of the use of
tactical nuclear weapons in Secretary KcNamara's statement
(above) is reflected elsewhere in various policy statements
of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations as well as in the
made at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. shortly
after he returned from a tour as Commander of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet.
5Roger Hillsman, "On NATO Strategy," in American








general public acceptance of current national security
policy* However, from a closer look at KcNamara's statement,
the serious reader draws a more subtle but meaningful in-
ference. Although it is admittedly a somewhat speculative
judgment, it is concluded that the tactical nuclear weapon
has a limited value in the conduct of American foreign
policy* The moral aspects associated with the use of
nuclear weapons in a cause not directly linked to an imme-
diate threat to U.S. national secruity are serious and com-
pletely unpredictable* The idea was best expressed at a
time when the United States still possessed a significant
degree of nuclear superiority* It is nonetheless applicable
today*
What ties the hands of American policy aside from
expendlentlal calculations appears to be the
morally crushing choice of using catastrophic and
random means of destruction without a provocation
or a threat of comparable dimensions •*>
Nevertheless, both the Soviet Union and the United
States are equipped with, and are prepared to use, tactical
nuclear weapons in a limited encounter if the situation
should demand such measures. What conditions will force
this choice upon either antagonist, and what the results of
such a decision will be, remain to be B^mxim It is abundantly
Gabriel A* Almond, The American People and Foreign
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clear, however, that the likelihood of keeping a limited war
limited, once the use of tactical nuclear weapon* has been
introduced, is vastly reduced*
This argument becomes more meaningful when viewed in
the light of the following Soviet military statements
It should be emphasised that, with the international
relations existing under present-day conditions and
the present level of development of military equip-
ment, an armed conflict will inevitably develop into
a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn
into the conflict* 7
It must be recalled that during the years 1945
through 1948, when the United States could supposedly have
made the greatest use of the threat of nuclear attack, it
failed to do so* The very enormity of the nuclear weapon
prevented the united States from using it as a diplomatic
instrument regardless of the monopoly it possessed* Soviet
propaganda would not have enjoyed the success it did, had it
not been for a vague feeling shared by most Americans* The
belief existed that a local conflict, or one where the
Issues were of minor importance, was simply not amenable to
solution by the threat of, or the use of, nuclear weapons*
7
V* o* Sokolovsky, "The Soviet View of Modern war,"
in V* J* Sokolovsky (ed«), Military Strategy (Moscow: 1962)*
Manuscript prepared by the Translation Services Branch,
Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson AF3, Ohio, pp*
164-250. Quoted in full in Posvar, op * cit * , pp* 32-54. At
the time this article was written, General Sokolovsky held
the post of General Inspector, Group of General Inspectors,








It was not Soviet Russia but rather the instinct of humanity
which tacitly drew the correlation between the size of the
war and the destructive power of the weapons employed. It
is noteworthy that neither the victories of Mao Tse Tung,
nor Marko's guerrilla campaign, nor the Prague coup, nor the
Berlin blockade, nor even the Korean invasion, justified
atomic retaliation. The horror inspired by the atomic
weapon seemed to have paralyzed the United States as much
as, or more than, the Soviet divisions massed on the borders
8
of a Europe incapable of defending itself.
The year 1949, as it heralded the end of the U.S.
atomic monopoly, also ushered in a reappraisal of the use of
atomic weapons by U.S. policymakers. The Korean War re-
mained a limited war by a decision which was never fully
confirmed but which determined the conduct of operation by
both sides. The limitations concerned the number of bellig-
erents, the theatre of operations, the weapons employed, and
the aims of the combatants. The non-use of atomic weapons
followed logically from this double limitation of the number
of belligerents and the theatre of operations. Among other
things, the Korean experience proved the possibility of a
9
non-atomic war between major contestants in the atomic age.
gRaymond Aron, On War (Garden City, New York:









With the rearmament of the West, following Korea, and
the creation of the military strength of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, a further change was noted in the
prevalent theories concerning the employment of atomic
weapons. The distinction was no longer drawn between a
local war waged with conventional weapons and a general war
waged with atomic weapons. Now the distinction was drawn
between local wars waged with tactical nuclear weapons and a
general war in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used
in the land battles while strategic air forces struck far
behind the front lines at the heart of the enemy territory.
Gradually, the tactical nuclear weapon found its way
into U.S. military strategy as a substitute for large ground
forces, especially on the European continent. The error of
this line of thinking became apparent as the Soviets made
similar technological refinements in atomic and nuclear
weaponry.
It was at this time that a plethora of intricate and
highly sophisticated concepts emerged concerning the theory
of nuclear conflict. Phrases such as "graduated response,"
"massive retaliation," "second strike capability," "flexible
response," and many others became commonplace.
Despite the proliferation of ideas on the refinement
of nuclear warfare, they all contained a common denominator.












warfare could be discriminating. Devices such as low-yield
weapons, "clean bombs," military targetting and the term
"tactical nuclear weapon" itself are all outgrowths of the
idea, nay the conviction, that discrimination can be prac-
ticed by both sides in a war involving the use of nuclear
weapons.
It is felt that, for several good reasons, discrimi-
nation ia a nuclear exchange is impossible. First of all,
discrimination is psychologically impossible to maintain.
If the stakes are high, and they would have to be to involve
nuclear weapons in the first place, there is little reason
to believe that a nuclear-equipped power would choose defeat
rather than resort to its "indiscriminate nuclear capabili-
ties." As Raymond Aron has noted:
Extreme weapons imply extreme issues, and these in
their turn preclude rational calculations in the
conduct of operations. 1®
If discrimination is psychologically impossible, it
is even more so technically impossible. The yield of a
nuclear weapon aimed at a well-hardened enemy missile site
would have to be considerable in order to be effective. As
a result, the nuclear side-effects associated with such a
detonation would probably reach adjacent non-military in-








suitable military targets, is quite often such that urban
centers would inevitably be hit. Finally, it is worth not-
ing that nearly all analyses of nuclear warfare take for
granted that a nuclear missile, once fired, will achieve 100
per cent accuracy. Reliability estimates usually receive
more consideration than accuracy figures. The painful fact
is that if anything is predictable in weaponry (no matter
how sophisticated) it is the fact that error will exist.
Most terminal guidance systems are designed about the con-
cept of detecting error and correcting for it, in a continu-
ing sequence. It does not take a very high percent error,
in a high-yield missile fired from a range of five thousand
miles at a suburban military target to produce a miss dis-
tance which will effect the neighboring urban populace.
Finally, it has been pointed out to U.S. policymakers
by many Europeans that nuclear discrimination is politically
impractical. The use of only tactical nuclear weapons by
the U.S. and the USSR might be a form of limited encounter
from the standpoint of Washington and Moscow but certainly
not for those countries which made up the battleground.
Such a limited war fought in Europe would hardly seem
limited to Paris and Berlin.
Klaus Knorr, "The Strained Alliance," in Klaus
Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security (Princeton, New
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It seems obvious, if one adopts a less analytical
approach, that there are areas in the world where a limited
nuclear exchange would be more likely to be kept limited
than other areas (if such limitation is possible at all).
From this observation the over-riding consideration emerges.
What really counts in limiting war is the issue involved.
If the issue, or the objective, is grave enough, the possi-
bility of limiting the conflict over it diminishes to zero,
all other considerations notwithstanding. For this reason,
it is important for U.S. policymakers to determine, before
the fact, which areas and which Issues are not important
enough to risk a general nuclear war over their defense.
The tendency of the United States to equate any concession
as "soft," or to establish all issues of conflict with its
Communist opponents as equally important has been the
greatest weakness of postwar foreign policy. Any policy
which is largely motivated by a "Munich Syndrome" is, in
fact, an abdication of politics for it is a denial of alter-
natives.
The policy of the United States toward the employment
of tactical nuclear weapons is well summarized in a state-
ment by Secretary of Defense McNaraara, in the spring of
1965:
Even in limited war situations, we should not pre-
clude the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for no







But the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons
in limited conflicts should not be forced upon us
simply because we have no other means to cope with
them. 12
12Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement
before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services
Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and
1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965, p. 74.
MU4fl
CHAPTER VI
U.S. LIMITED WAR STRATEGY
Requirements
The present day existence of what is often called a
nuclear stalemate has set the stage for a variety of forms
of aggression, ranging from large-scale limited war to sub-
version in what are called "third areas." U.S. strategy
boils down to the maintenance of the politico-military
environment, within which aggression by any state (if it
must occur at all) shall be conducted within the previously
discussed context of limited war. This means, then, a con-
trolled political environment within which the necessity for
keeping war limited is obvious and is, at least tacitly,
acknowledged by all states capable of militarily expanding a
conflict beyond these limits. The following principal ele-
ments appear to be obvious requirements for the U.S. contri-
bution to this system:
1. An invulnerable, long-range missile force with a
second strike capability. This means, the ability to
Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in The Nuclear Age
(New York: Wiley & Sons, 1963). This expression appears
throughout his book and refers to areas which are neither
U.S. territories nor those of our major allies, but rather
those of our minor allies, neutrals, or perhaps even
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inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy after having
absorbed a surprise nuclear attack.
2. An effective system of alliances*
3. Procedures for ensuring the most effective use of
the resources commited to the U.S. defense program*
4. An adequate, well-equipped, mobile force to cope
2
with limited war.
Missile Force . The current status of the U.S. long-
range missile force indicates a marked superiority in the
quantity of ICBM*s. 3
The "hard bases" of the Minutemen and the relative
invulnerability of the Polaris missiles presently satisfy
the requirements of reliability, readiness, and
Maxwell D. Taylor, "Security Will Not Wait," Foreign
Affairs , Volume 39, January, 1961, p. 177.
3Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement
before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services
Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and
1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965 [hereafter cited as
McNamara' s Defense Statement J. Mr. McNamara *s statement
indicates that the 800 Minutemen and the 464 Polaris mis-
siles constitute a significant superiority in total long-
range deliverable mega-tonnage
, pp. 45-56. President
Johnson, in his "Defense Message," Congressional Quarterly ,
Vol. XXIII, No. 4, pp. 114-117, listed the strength of the
Strategic Retaliatory Forces on January 18, 1965, as: "More
than 850 ICBM's, 300 Polaris missiles and 900 strategic
bombers, half of which are on 15 minutes alert." He further
stated that these forces are superior in number and quality
than those of any other nation. The exact numbers differ
somewhat between the two statements, although they were made
within a month of each other. Both statements, however,












invulnerability, efforts by the United States to develop an
effective anti-missile defense system, currently represented
by the Nike X, are so far unproductive.
Alliance System . Since World War II, U.S. policy-
makers have recognized the global nature of its security
interests and the consequent need for reliable and effective
allies Joined to the U.S. by common goals and interests.
The idea of going it alone, as seems to have been attempted
in the Viet Nam and Santo Domingo policies of the spring and
summer of 1965, should be abandoned. An adequate security
program, then, should have the collateral effect of streng-
thening U.S. alliances, reducing dissension, and enhancing
mutual confidence. To achieve these results, U.S. commit-
ments should be made only after careful study and considera-
tion. But, once made, they must be unambiguous and credible.
Commitments, to be credible, must reflect the military
preparedness of the United States to respond quickly with
the type of assistance necessary. The local defense stra-
tegy of the United States, especially in "third areas" must
be dependent, to some degree, upon an effective indigenous
force, capable of holding the line until the U.S. response
can take effect. The self-confidence which this type of
local defense force would engender in our allies would sig-
nificantly enhance the value of the alliance. The primary









oriented toward the creation of this local defense capa-
bility. The magnitude and form of such aid would vary with
the strength and capabilities of the ally. It should be
noted that considerable friction has been generated within
the U.S. security alliance system over U.S. strategic bomber
and missile installations. Allies having these strategic
nuclear force installations on their soil are increasingly
subject to Soviet threats. As a matter of policy, a con-
tinuing re-estimate should be conducted of all overseas U.S.
bases as to their currency and contribution to U.S. stra-
tegic objectives. As the strategic mobility of U.S. limited
war forces improves, in speed and capacity, the need for
overseas establishments will diminish. U.S. policy on this
point should be unambiguous and the withdrawal of forces
should be undertaken as the increase in local defense capa-
bilities permit. Presently, about 77 per cent of all U.S.
military aid goes to eleven "third area" countries located
on or near the periphery of the communist bloc who are con-
fronted directly or indirectly with the threat of communist
aggression—Viet Nam, Taiwan, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thai-
land, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Laos, and the Philippine
Islands—are, therefore, designated "forward defense areas."
Total U.S. military and economic assistance will amount in
fiscal 1966, to $3,379,000,000. The amount spent on defense
i-
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by the United States, of over $50,000,000,000, could well be
4ineffective without foreign aid.
A Realistic Defense Organization . On January 30,
1961, President Kennedy, in his State of the Union message
signaled a change in the overall approach to U.S. defense by
instructing the new Defense Secretary
... to reappraise our entire defense strategy—our
ability to fulfill our commitments-—the effectiveness,
vulnerability and dispersal of our strategic bases,
forces and warning systems—the efficiency and economy
of our operation and organization—the elimination of
obsolete bases and installations—and the adequacy,
modernization and mobility of our present conventional
and nuclear forces and weapons systems in the light of
present and future dangers .5
The deadline for preliminary conclusions was set as
February 28. A further charge by the President to the
Secretary of Defense asked for the development of a force
structure "necessary to our military requirements without
regard to arbitrary or predetermined ceilings," and "at the
6lowest cost possible."
In carrying out these instructions, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara accomplished, to a large extent,
William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New
York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 317. The figures In Kaufmann,
for 1964 have been updated by the writer to reflect the
fiscal 1966 budget figures.
5John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message , January
30, 1961.








changes, more in methodology than in structure) in the U.S.
defense establishment. Concepts such as cost-effectiveness,
techniques of computer analysis and civilian experts became
permanent fixtures of the Defense Department. Efforts to
bring a sense of method and order to the vast and diverse
structure of the defense establishment began to bear fruit.
The over-arching criterion of the real national security
needs of the United States was applied with increasing, and
often painful, effect. The end results, thus far achieved,
have been a measurable increase in the capacity of the
United States to deal with the type of situation which the
present international environment presents. Among these is
the signal improvement in the ability of the United States
to fight limited wars.
Limited War Forces . The final element in the U.S.
security equation is a mobile, well-equipped limited war
force capable of force generation levels sufficient to
respond appropriately across the full spectrum of possible
enemy threats. This element is equally as important as the
strategic missile force. The relative importance of this
force will increase as the danger of a planned nuclear
aggression by the Soviet Union recedes in the face of our
visible readiness to retaliate in kind. The U.S. conven-
tional war capability has been woefully inadequate when







as 1961, the Army's financial requirements for the moderni-
zation of its equipment was estimated at about $3,000,000,000
7
a year for five years* The improvements in U.S. limited
war forces made since 1962 have been significant* The
number of combat-ready divisions since 1962 has increased
by 45 per cent. The number of tactical air squadrons has
increased 30 per cent; airlift capabilities have increased
by 75 per cent; and ship construction and modernisation have
increased by 100 per cent* operation Big Lift, conducted in
1964, demonstrated the ability to airlift one Army division
from one continent to another and increased to seven, the
of U*S. divisions stationed in Europe* By 1967, U.S.
airlift capabilities will have increased by 400 pwc cent
8
under the present defense program*
The increase in Special forces requirements, within
the limited war force superstructure, has significantly, as
previously mentioned, l>emi noted* This facet of the limited
war capability of the United States was made in direct
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i February 18, 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara presented in 1966 Defense Budget and his 1966-1970
Defense Program to the House Armed Services Committee. The
initial portion of his presentation was an over-view of the
general international situation facing the defense planners
as well as a statement of U.S. objectives. These are worth
reviewing briefly in the light of the potential commitment
of the U.S. limited war capabilities.
In a general assessment of the international situa-
tion, as it bears on military policies and programs, Mr.
McNamara cited the change in Soviet leadership and the
detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese People's
Republic as significant highlights of the year. Of much
greater significance, however, is the "... gradual relaxa-
tion of the previously rigid bi-polarization of world power,
9
which has been gaining momentum in recent years."
On the communist side, the absolute control of the
Soviet Union has been successfully challenged, and now, not
only Yugoslavia, but also mainland China, Albania and, to a
lesser extent, other communist nations of eastern Europe are
following policies directed to their own interests. The
cleavage between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic
9McNamara »s Defense Budget , op . cit • , p. 13,
-A (
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is so basic and is so directly involved in the national
interests of each country, that it is unlikely that the
change in Soviet leadership will, by itself, open the way to
a reconciliation. The achievement, by the Chinese People's
Republic, of a nuclear capability will not improve Sino-
Soviet relations.
The general U.S. objective, in the light of this con-
tinued U.S. -Soviet confrontation is
... to seek a world in which each nation is free to
develop in its own way, unmolested by its neighbors,
free of the fear of armed attack from the more power-
ful nations. 10
U.S. aid, both military and economic, will be imple-
mented to achieve this objective. More specifically, this
rule can be applied to the different areas of the U.S.
defense perimeter in different ways.
Southeast Asia . The North Vietnamese and the Commu-
nist Chinese are putting into practice their theory that any
government of an emerging nation can be toppled by exter-
nally supported, covert armed aggression, even when that
government has the backing of U.S. economic and military
assistance. As a matter of fact, South Viet Nam has been
selected to prove this theory. The outcome will have grave
effects upon similar peripheral areas and less stable na-







therefore, is to support, by whatever limited force is
necessary, the legitimate government in South Viet Ham. The
future of Laos is intimately tied into this struggle. U.S.
policy, then, involves the continuation of support to the
Laos government and to press for implementation of the
Geneva Accords* U.S. military assistance and training help
in Thailand continues. In addition to the Military Assis-
tance Advisory Group, the united States also maintains
logistic facilities in Thailand as vital support facilities
in the capacity to support a limited war operation in South-
east Asia* U.S. support and assistance is oriented toward
enabling the local governments to reach their internal
defense goals and to demonstrate "that mutual defense under-
11takings cut both ways."
The Far East . The principal local defense commitment
in the Far Sast, in terms of resources, is in Korea. The
United States maintains two divisions and helps support
nineteen Korean Army and Marine divisions. U.S. military
and economic aid to Korea is one of the largest, although
efforts are being sought to reduce it gradually as the local
defense capability of the Republic of Korea improves.
U.S. policy towards Japan is to maintain the basic-
ally sound relationship which presently exists. U.S.
UIbid. t pp. 12-13.
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military installations in Japan are vital to the stabiliza-
tion of the Par East. The ability of the United States to
implement its limited war capability still depends, to a
large extent, upon forward staging facilities such as those
in Japan. In Taiwan, the United States is supporting a
large modern military force which is necessary if that island
is to be defensible. Throughout the Par Cast, the presence
of large and powerful United States forces provides an im-
portant stabilizing influence as well as clear evidence of




South Asia . U.S. aid to India has provided a measure
of constructive influence which was not so much in evidence
prior to the Chinese attack in 1962. U.S. plans, over the
next several years, include the provision of modest defense
production assistance and technical assistance through a
program of credit sales. This program is paralleled with
efforts by the United States to reassure the Pakistan govern-
ment that U.S. aid to India will not be at the expense of
Pakistan's security to which the U.S. is committed by mutual
security agreements.
Near East . The Near East presents the United States
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uneven economic development. The U.S. objective in Iran is
to help build up her military forces "to the point where
they could insure internal security and provide at least an
initial defense against a Soviet attack across their bor-
13der." In the remainder of the Near East, the U.S. Mili-
tary Assistance Program is confined to training, except in
Jordan, where a small materiel program is maintained*
A principal U.S. objective in the Near East has long
been to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute from escalating. Sub-
stantial Soviet bloc aid—both economic and military—into
the area (mainly in Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Syria,
and Yemen) has made this objective most difficult. To avoid
total dependence upon Soviet arms, the United States is
pursuing a policy of selective arms sales, including Hawk
missiles, to some Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and
Jordan. The periodic military presence of U.S. forces in
joint exercises and deployments in this area is calculated
to demonstrate the U.S. determination and capability to sup-
14port and assist in a limited war effort if required.
Africa . United States security interests in Africa
are mainly confined to Ethiopia and Morocco where communica-


















maintains an air base. These facilities are of primary con-
cern as they relate tc the southern flank of NATO. This
importance is reflected in major Soviet military assistance
to Somalia and Algeria. Approximately half of the U.S.
military assistance funds for Africa are allocated to
Ethiopia with a small amount to Libya. Regarding the areas
south of the Sahara, the U.S. aid program objective is to
assist in the maintenance of internal security and govern-
mental stability for a sufficiently long period of time to
permit the developing nations to create the framework of an
economic, political, and ideological structure.
Latin America . Even more fundamental than the linger-
ing threat of communist infiltration and subversion is the
complex problem of economic stagnation and political insta-
bility which still plagues major portions of Latin America.
Without discussing each particular problem area, it can be
generally stated that a significant improvement has been
noted in the resolution of this fundamental problem since
President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress.
The continued existence of a communist regime in Cuba
poses a serious threat to the less stable countries of
Latin-America. U.S. action through the machinery of the OAS
has been effective. By September, 1964, all members, except
Mexico, had severed relations with Cuba. OAS sanctions are
making it more difficult for Cuba to dispense arms money and
se a ri."
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propaganda in other Latin-American countries. The United
States is continuing its efforts to isolate Cuba from the
free world, thereby Increasing the Soviet burden of support*
A unified strike force is now permanently located in Florida
for the express purpose of prosecuting a limited war against
Cuba specifically or as a staging point for a limited war
effort in other portions of Latin America.
Europe and the NATO Area . The current economic
problems of the United Kingdom, the continuing difficulties
in Cyprus, and the recurring dissidence of certain NATO
allies should not obscure the fact that U.S. European poli-
cies since 1945 have been largely successful. The NATO
allies are also the principal trading partners of the United
States. Western Europe, therefore, constitutes a serious
area of U.S. national interest. The basic objectives of the
United States in Western Europe are to ensure the security
of that area against communist aggression, to further its
growth, and to promote its economic stability. On these
essentials, the NATO partners do not disagree. The question
of how to achieve these objectives is the bone of contention.
Two basic questions have plagued unity and coopera-
tion of the NATO partners. They are the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in a war in Europe and the role of the
European NATO partners in the strategic nuclear mission. In











European NATO partners with tactical nuclear weapons under
U.S. control. The question of ownership and control is
raised in the second case as well* The basic American
policy is that the United States will not relinquish control
of the "trigger" except under the guise of a single, coor-
dinated chain of command. The fragmentation and compartmen-
tation of NATO nuclear power which would result from any
other arrangement would be dangerous.
There is no fixed timetable to the pursuit of an
Allied nuclear force. Any final arrangement must support




The importance of the U.S. limited war capability was
underscored by the Secretary of Defense on February 18,
1964.
While all of our military forces would be employed
in a general war, it is primarily the limited war
mission which shapes the size and character of the
General Purpose Forces."
The total commitment to free world security, assumed
by the United States, coupled with the limited General Pur-








planners the necessity of expanding limited war capabilities
in three directions:
1. Advance deployment of forces to potential trouble
areas*
2* Maintenance of a highly mobile force in the
United States for rapid response anywhere in the world*
3* ire-positioning of materiel and equipment in
potential trouble areas and the rapid airlift of personnel
from the United states as necessary.
Although in the first case* there are relatively
large U*s. forces deployed abroad, both in Europe and the
Pacific areas, there are obvious limits to this approach,
quite aside from its adverse effect upon the balance of pay-
ments.
The second method requires adequate sea-lift and air-
lift capabilities, toward which the United States is working*
The third approach, somewhat of a synthesis of the
first two, is the most achievable, given the present state
of development of U.S* mobile forces*
The major objective of U.S. military policy since
1961 has been to strengthen the non-nuclear capabilities of
the free world, particularly those of NATO* Concurrently,
the United States has been increasing its tactical nuclear
capabilities, particularly those in Europe* From 1961 to
1965, the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in
Western Europe was Increased by 60 p^j: cent*
I ij
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The Axiny. Combat-ready divisions, as of February,
1965, totaled sixteen, reorganized from the pentomic to the
ROAD configuration, giving them greater strength, fire-power
and flexibility. All units have achieved a higher degree of
mobility. Army aviation is expanded, strengthened, and
highly modernized. The Army's special warfare capability
has been increased from three to seven Special Forces Groups.
The tactical nuclear capability has been increased by the
substitution of a more mobile, longer-range missile system
and improvement in nuclear artillery. The staying power of
all combat forces has been increased and reserve components
have been reorganized to expedite their augmentation.
The Navy . Considerable review has been given to the
enhancement of the limited war capability of the Navy. The
main problem areas are the Anti-Air-Warfare systems (AAW),
the Anti-Submarine Warfare systems (ASW), and nuclear pro-
pulsion. The General Purpose Forces of the Navy include
fifteen attack carrier weapons systems and nine Anti-Sub-
marine Warfare weapons systems. The attack submarine forces
number 104, of which 23 are nuclear powered. Multi-purpose
surface vessels (with both AAW and ASW capabilities) number
263. Substantial increases in the amphibian assault and
logistic support ships, in procurement and modernization, is









the mobility and response capabilities of the U.S. limited
war forces.
The Marine Corps . A force level of three combat
divisions and their air wings with a modernization program
similar to that being implemented in the Navy air units and
the Army ground forces. Emphasis is placed upon the role of
the Marine Corps in conducting limited war.
The Air Force . A major expansion and modernization
of the tactical general purpose forces has been going on
since 1961. Improvements have been achieved in fire-power
and effectiveness. A tactical fighter force of twenty-four
air wings, a tactical bomber force of two squadrons , and a
mixed group of counter-insurgency aircraft constitute the
limited war forces of the Air Force. The new challenges
which face the latter forces have left the question of the
exact nature of aircraft, weapons, and tactics, generally
open.
The expenditures for all General Purpose Forces for
the fiscal year 1966 will total $19,000,000,000 and consti-
tutes a steadily increasing emphasis on the limited warfare
16
capabilities of the U.S. armed forces.
Having determined the requirements of our national








our military capabilities, we are faced with an obvious
question: does U.S. foreign policy satisfy the needs of
U.S. national security, as postulated,' Taken a step further:
is the concept of limited war, as put forth in this paper,
supported by current U.S. foreign policy/ The answer to
both questions is a categorical no. In defending this
blunt condemnation, three main points should be raised.
First, L.->. foreign policy has, in the past two or
three years, taken on all the appearances of an intent to
"go it alone" in international affairs. Three glaring ex-
amples of this intent are the joint Belgian-U.S. Congo air-
lift, the initiation of air strikes against North Viet Nam
and the Dominican intervention. Disregarding the military
correctness of the decisions involved in these three in-
stances, they have all shared one common defect. They were,
for all practical purposes, all undertaken with little or no
serious effort made at prior consultation with our major
allies. At a time when close Allied coordination is a defi-
nite requirement of its national security policy, the United
States has succeeded in estranging its major allies to a
greater extent than at any time since 1945 (excepting per-
haps the Suez Crisis of 1956).
A second point worth considering is one which is
slowly becoming painfully evident in Southeast Asia. De-






security, while at the same time minimizing the extent of
U.S. troop deployment, one fact is abundantly clear. The
concept of flexible response, while providing well-tailored
measures at the lower end of the spectrum of limited war,
must also be applicable at the upper end of the scale.
Military analysts, as well as policymakers, have devoted a
great deal of effort praising the qualities of flexible
response in the areas of military assistance, advisers,
Special Forces, and so forth. Unfortunately, a similar
effort has not been made to enlighten the American people on
the aspects of deep military involvement in a large-scale
limited war situation. Should the Chinese People's Republic
so dictate, it could involve the United States in a war of
Korean dimensions or greater in Southeast Asia. The Ameri-
can people have not been conditioned for this aspect of
flexible response. How the people will respond to the
impending threat of massive U.S. troop commitment is one of
the unknown quantities which is presently plaguing the
Johnson Administration.
On a purely military plane, without regard for U.S.
consensual approval, U.S. military power is greater, in a
higher state of readiness, and better disposed than it has
ever been on the eve of a possible major conflict.




force afloat operates in the East and South China Seas out
of bases in Taiwan and the Philippines. There are three
Army Divisions in the Pacific, one in Hawaii, and two in
Korea, as well as Airborne and Marine units on alert on
Okinawa. The 5tt and 13tb Air Forces are on hand with exten-
sive operating facilities in Japan, Guam, Okinawa, and the
Philippines.
With massive supply and the pre-stocking of military
equipment in forward areas, no appreciable time would be
required to bring a considerable force to bear should a
major conflict break out at any point along the periphery of
mainland China. The Communist Chinese are well aware of
17both the proximity and the magnitude of this force.
A final point deals with the limitation of war itself.
Whereas the Korean War was, in many respects, a classic
example of the limitation of war, Viet Nam is not. The
policy of escalation constitutes a blank check for U.S.
policymakers to exceed the various limitations of war in
Southeast Asia. The United States has successively renounced
such previous limitations as military targetting, air strikes
beyond the 17ti> parallel, the combat presence of American
troops, the direct participation by U.S. combat units in the
Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Will Vietnam Lead to World









field and recently the renunciation of the concept of sanc-
tuary •
These three points constitute a political departure
from the previously-discussed formula for U.S. national
security as well as from the concept of limited war as typi-
fied by Korea. Now, in 1965, at a time when the United
States is far better equipped to fight a limited war, its
policymakers are inexorably dealing themselves out of the
game*
The major casualty in U.S. defense policy has been
the failure of the United States to perceive the fact that
limited war still requires limited ends; limited aims still
require limited means j and no degree of technological so-




War, as conceived and conducted through the eighteenth
century, waa limited by definition* The political system
within which statesmen used war caused conflicts to he
limited simply in that they were implemented, ultimately,
with the understanding that they would not disrupt the
system itself* Marginal alterations, within the system,
were sought and obtained, when other methods failed, by
means of war* War, then, by its function, operated to main-
tain its political environment*
The industrialization of Europe exerted a profound
influence on war during the nineteenth century* The vast
increase in man*s ability to destroy his fellow man provided
the means whereby war could exceed its heretofore inherent
limits*
Despite the exceptions to the general rule, such as
the Religious Wars, the wars of the French Revolution and
the Napoleonic Wars, war, up to the twentieth century, was
still normally limited and was conducted within the house
rules of the European nation-state system* It was the
threat to destroy this system which also destroyed the neat
concept of limited war* No longer, after 1914, was it pos-
sible to lose a war and then "stay in the game." No longer
MOXJ
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did the winners strive to keep the losers in the system* At
about this time of revolutionary change, the United States
emerged upon the political scene as an actor rather than as
an observer.
The source of much of U.S. behavior in international
politics stems purely from the particular moment in history
when she stepped out from the wings. The United States had
very little experience as a major power in the art of
limited war within the classical European state system. In
fact, the first major U.S. effort in war was to tip the
balance in a struggle to destroy the system. The total war,
which ensued in 1914, operated outside the limits of the
system. It involved total effort, massive destruction, and
its ends were blurred by ideological exhortations. America's
second major effort was also a general war—more total in
nearly every respect. Is it any wonder that, in 1945, the
Americans had accrued a singular set of attitudes in the
conduct of international politics*
Americans tend to be extremely sensitive to what
other nations think of them. Americans look for quick and
ready solutions-—"rational solutions"—to problems of for-
eign policy. They conceive of war and stress as unusual and
temporary aberrations from the normalcy of peace and pros-
perity. Americans scorn a "no win" policy and demand a
total victory over any foe with the temerity to force the
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United States to the point of wax* When war comes, diplo-
macy and politics are summarily abandoned in the conviction
that wars are purely military matters to be won not dis-
cussed* Unconditional surrender, to Americans, is a natural
objective in any war* Such concepts as peace without vic-
tory, the Cold War, and protracted limited war are, to
Americans, burdensome and exasperating* U*5* values are
thought to be universal, and It properly follows that her
opponents are either charlatans or simpletons*
What had been lost in the debris of World War II,
apparently forever, was the elaborately structured state
system which had made possible the more or less orderly con-
duct of international affairs* By 1945, there was no longer
a carefully stratified international society of nation-
states in which each knew its appropriate place, area of
competence, and degree of deference* Instead there existed,
at the power end of the scale, only Moscow and Washington,
and all other states were relatively at, or near, the zero
point of weakness* Anything like the historic process of
conflict and adjustment was, in such an environment, impos-
sible. 2
William S* Livingston, "British Politics and American
Policy," in M* D* Irish (ed*), World Pressures on American
Foreign Policy (Snglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Frentice-Hall
,
1964), p. 75.
2Charles 0. Lerche, The Cold War and After (Englewood








The very gradual realisation of this fact by the
Truman Administration determined, in a sense, the institu-
tionalization of the Cold War by the fact of U.S. interven-
tion in Korea. It is in this context also that the Korean
Intervention can be considered not a victory but a success.
The inability of the Administration to articulate its policy
resulted in bitter recrimination and the repugnant after-
taste of defeat and disillusion experienced by the American
public. Korea was, in any event, a classic example of the
deliberate limitation of the means and, for a time, the ends
of war.
As soon as the major antagonists came to the sobering
realization that a stalemate existed and that open warfare
between them could result in frustration and disaster, but
never victory, they set quietly about the business of find-
ing the means of limiting the conflict. This meant, among
other things, finding boundary lines within which the war
could safely be conducted—that is, with the ultimate sur-
vival of both parties implicitly guaranteed. The "parameters
of permissibility" have been observed by U.S. policymakers
up to February, 1965, when the Johnson Doctrine added a new
dimension to U.S. foreign policy. These parameters were




















Berlin (1961), and Cuba (1962)
.
3 In the context of the
developing stalemate, the necessity of the limitation of war
became evident*
In the later years of the Cold War (since about 1958),
the hostile dialogue between the United States and the
Soviet Union became a conversation as a third, unaligned,
4
world demanded and received a hearing from both sides. It
is in the light of this emerging international system of
diffused power that U.S. policymakers grew to accept the
concept of limited war as an instrument for achieving their
long-range objectives by engaging the enemy locally in con-
flicts, often exasperating, usually protracted, and nearly
always devoid of aspects of immediate victory.
The conflict in Viet Nam in the spring of 1965 illus-
trates the latest form in which the concept of limited war
has evolved as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
The accepted rules, which have come into existence
from usage and the lack of any contradiction, have unfortun-
ately favored the aggressor. These rules, as observed by
the United States, Soviet Russia, and the Chinese People*
s
Republic have permitted an aggressor to conduct undeclared
military operations against another state by proxy, as in
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limited war precluded any counter-measures that reached into
the sanctuary from which the aggression was supplied and
directed*
These rules, in Viet Nam in 1964, permitted the North
Viet Nam government to establish subversive forces in £outh
Viet Nam for the purpose of over-throwing that government*
Up to the events in the Tonkin Gulf in early 1965, the Hanoi
government was able to maintain full control of the degree
of aggression, the magnitude of risk, and the possible con-
sequences* They were thus able to establish and maintain
the level of hostilities which best suited them* The Hanoi
government was also able to increase or decrease the level
of activity and tension to suit the external reaction to,
and the effect of, the conflict* The maximum cost, to the
Hanoi government, of failure could be established by placing
a limit upon the amount of men and materiel involved*
Should the element of risk exceed the expected gains, the
North Vietnamese could simply wait, to try later at a more
propitious moment*
The victim of this kind of aggression, according to
these rules, was limited to a response, not to exceed the
magnitude of the aggressor's initiative* The possible gains
for the aggressor, then, are virtually unlimited, whereas
those of the victim amount to nothing more than successful
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the aggressor was the sum total of men and equipment in-
vested in the venture while the possible cost to the victim
was unlimited.
Under these rules, there was a tremendous inducement
to Communist aggression* It constituted the safest con-
ceivable type of war for a potential aggressor—everything
to win, and very little to lose. The attacker hazarded
nothing more than the possibility of failure of an attack.
The victim could achieve nothing more than the repulsion of
the attack with a minimum of damage sustained.
This pattern was fundamentally altered by events in
the Tonkin Gulf. The West initially gave tacit approval of
this change of tactics undertaken by the United States. The
balance, which bulked so heavily in favor of the aggressor,
has been altered. The threat of reprisal across national
borders has raised the risk to the aggressor as well as the
attainable goals of the victim. The revision of the rules
of this undeclared type of war is currently in progress.
The precise nature of the change is still unclear. Sven
more unclear, and a little frightening, is the question of
whether there is any more plan and order to this change than
a mere ad hoc and haphazard gamble on the part of U.S.
policymakers. One thing that is abundantly clear, however,
is the fact that a complete reappraisal of the nature of this
kind of war and its consequences is in order.
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It is felt that this revision does not alter the
nature of true wars of liberation* Spontaneous and unspon-
sored revolutionary movements within the boundaries of a
nation are not affected* The rebel and national forces, in
such cases, will resolve their differences in the sort of
protracted guerrilla activity whose rules and accepted con-
duct are familiar* However, the proxy-type of subversive
conflicts across national boundaries have been permanently
altered by the United States and by their tacit acceptance,
thus far, by the governments of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.
The subtle implication of this change is not lost
upon potential proponents of this type of war, especially in
Southeast Asia, where the conditions, heretofore, were so
ripe* The security and sanctuary from which aggression can
be safely launched is no longer guaranteed. The risks, in
general, of external subversion, disguised as a civil war of
liberation, have greatly increased.
The situation which is now being presented to poten-
tial Southeast Asian communist aggressors, by the United
States, appears to be so designed to make the risk-gain
equation no longer profitable for this type of aggression.
On the other hand, careful efforts by the Johnson Adminis-
tration to keep the conflict as low as possible and to
marshal official and public consensus indicates a signal
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war in American foreign policy. The limited but measured
acceleration of U.S. response in Viet Nam is rapidly creat-
ing the conditions within which a decision must be reached.
Sufficient and unambiguous avenues for escape have been
created for the aggressors. Similar avenues for U.S.
5policymakers do not exist. The present U.S. policy in Viet
Nam appears to be postulated upon a "must win" premise* If
so, this appears to be an effort to remove the concept of
limited war from the realm of politics.
Basically, the strategy of escalation has departed
from the entire concept of limited war as it was crystal-
lized in Korea. The tailoring of means to ends, which
typified the Korean conflict no longer exists. U.S. policy
in Viet Nam is attempting to marry limited ends to means
which, although they may not be unlimited, can best be
described as "having no price tag."
The aim of the Johnson Administration appears to be a
limited one, intended to push the Viet Cong forces back into
a small-scale guerrilla activity as the basis for a negoti-
ated settlement. The aim, it appears, is not to "win the
war" in the sense to . hich Americans had become accustomed
6prior to 1950. If it becomes apparent that this aim is not
5
Editorial in The Washington Post , February 17, 1965.
Howard Margolis, 'U.S. Strategy in Viet War," The
Washington Post , July 18, 1965.








achievable under current U.S. policy in Viet Nam, the John-
son Administration will be faced with a grave decision*
Viet Nam—And the Future . A paper such as this
,
dealing with the role of limited war, inevitably leads to
the consideration of what direction U.S. foreign policy
should and must take in its most serious test—Southeast
Asia. It is also inevitable that an analysis of events so
recent and still unfolding leads the writer inescapably into
the risky and unrewarding realm of prediction and conjec-
ture. This risk is accepted, albeit reluctantly, in the
belief that any analysis is valueless unless it postulates,
tacitly or explicitly, an indication of where current u.s.
policy is likely to lead.
It will be remembered that the continuing nature of
the subject matter of this paper demanded the selection of a
cut-off date beyond which scholarly research became unwar-
ranted and ill advised. This date was that of the articula-
tion of the U.S. policy of escalation which coincided with
the initiation of air strikes against North Viet Nam on
February 7, 1965. This limit has been adhered to. However,
events which have occurred after that date and which are of
sufficient significance to support the general thesis of
this paper are herein referred to.
It is clear to most reasonable observers that a com-
plete military victory by the U.S., although theoretically
i-
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attainable, la, in fact, achievable only at a cost far in
excess of the requirements of American national interests*
At the same time, it is clear that neither unlimited expan-
sion of U.S. military involvement, on the one hand, nor
complete withdrawal, on the other, are acceptable alterna-
tives in the pursuit of those interests. The obvious course
lies somewhere in the middle.
It is an obvious fact that the alternative of un-
limited, or unchecked, escalation must, at some point,
involve a direct military confrontation with the Chinese
People's Republic. It is an equally obvious fact that the
alternative of complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia would
be an abdication by the United States of its responsibility
as a great power as well as of its national interests.
The most striking characteristic of a great nation is
not the mere possession of power but rather the way in which
that power is exercised* A great power exercises its
strength with wisdom, restraint, and with a constant aware-
ness of the overall view of its role in world affairs. A
lesser power exercises its strength recklessly, parochially,
and irresponsibly. There is ample evidence, of a lesser
power, in our own Atlantic Community, the exercise of whose
newly-regained strength is often directed out of personal
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Limited war, by definition, requires the explicit
definition of the various parameters of permissibility* Its
results are neither victory nor defeat, but rather a nego-
tiated settlement which constitutes a limited achievement
for both sides within the framework of the status quo ante *
This is to say that neither the Chinese nor the united
States may suffer a disastrous loss of influence in South-
east Asia* If, then, U.S. policy is to follow a logical
application of the concept of limited war, it must continue
to be one of determination to end the war at the earliest
possible time by a negotiated settlement involving major
concessions by both sides*
The coming of the monsoon season in Southeast Asia,
though not nearly as apocalyptic an event as it is claimed
to be, brings the war in Viet Nam into a new phase* This
phase is going badly for the United States* C >st, in terms
of supplies, troop commitment, and casualties, is mounting
steadily* Paralleling this increase in U.S. involvement is
the increase of bitterness, frustration, and criticism
engendered at home and abroad towards U»Sm foreign policy*
U*S. leadership, under these pressures, has been consistent
and reasonably steadfast*
Throughout this increasing involvement, a continuous
effort has been underway to seek a settlement* In 1964 and







conferences on the neutrality and territorial integrity of
Cambodia, hoping that such meetings would provide occasion
for informal discussions with the Chinese People* s Republic
on Viet Nam.
In April, 1965, the United States accepted the pro-
posal by Secretary-General U Thant to visit Peking and Hanoi
for talks on Viet Nam.
On February 20, 1965, the United Kingdom, encouraged
by the United States, proposed that the U.K. and the USSR
act as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to seek a Viet
Nam settlement with all the Geneva signatories.
On April 7, President Johnson stated explicitly that
the United States was prepared to enter unconditional dis-
cussions for the termination of the war in Viet Nam. On
April 8, in reply to an appeal by seventeen non-aligned
nations, the United States repeated this same proposal.
Prom the 13u> through the 17m of May, the Canadian
representative on the International Control Commission in
Viet Nam went to Hanoi to discuss the North Vietnamese re-
action to "the pause" in bombing.
To all these efforts, the Peking and Hanoi govern-
ments have been implacably hostile. It is clear from this
lack of response that the two governments foresee a complete
Communist victory in Viet Nam. This realisation poses two











1. The continuance of support to the South Viet-
namese military effort to such an extent as to preclude the
possibility of a North Vietnamese victory.
2. The maintenance of communication with the Peking
and Hanoi governments to keep open avenues for negotiation*
We have seen in recent years that nationalism is a
far more potent force than Communism. We have noted in
Vietnamese history a continuing struggle against external
suppression. A central core of this struggle has been the
resistance to Chinese domination. Sven a cursory study of
the basic socio-political structure of Viet Nam reveals
values which are ultimately antithetical to Communist prin-
ciples. Though the ultimate form of a negotiated settle-
ment in Viet Nam is unpredictable, with the above factors in
mind, it is not too difficult to envision a unified and
neutralized Viet Nam with the United States and the Soviet
Union as co-guarantors against Communist Chinese territorial
encroachments
•
U.S. military policy today, in its total involvement,
presents somewhat of a paradox. Despite the recent build-up
in limited war capabilities, U.S. commitments far exceed its
capacity. The reduction in the 1966 military budget over
that of 1965, although small, is significant. The Secretary
of Defense ably explains this reduction as the reflection of
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rather than an indication of a decrease of real military
capacity* Although this argument is persuasive and abun-
dantly accompanied by data, it is not entirely convincing.
The answer lies more in the general political requirements
of the Johnson Administration. The commitment of the United
States to domestic problems, as well as a subtle effort to
respond to a similar decrease in Soviet military outlay, are
the two important factors supported by such a budgetary
decrease. It Is significant enough to note that the last
two years have reflected the first absolute decrease in over
ten years. Considering, in addition, the rapidly rising
costs of weapons technology, as well as the current burgeon-
ing of communist subversion in Southeast Asia, the budgetary
trend takes on meaning. Certainly, it is not an effort to
broaden the alternatives open to U.S. policymakers.
Insufficient material is available to support an
extensive analysis of the change in the conduct oi U.S.
policy in Viet Nam. However, it is abundantly clear that a
limited war is in progress, that it is expanding, and that
the major parties to the conflict, the United States and the
Chinese People's Republic (by proxy), are nuclear equipped.
There should be no misunderstanding. As of this date, the
Communist Chinese have exploded their second nuclear device
—
this last one a free-fall explosion. This is the next logi-
cal step to an operational bomb. Contrary to popular belief,
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the so-cali id tactical nuclear weapon is not necessarily the
ultimate in sophistication* A snail tactical fighter,
equipped with a low-yield nuclear device, even a primitive
one, is a prime tactical nuclear weapons system that can
easily be developed with hardware already available to the
mainland Chinese* If the United States is unable to impose
its wishes and achieve its objectives against the opposition
of a conventionally-equipped Communist China, it will be
even less successful against a China equipped with a tacti-
cal nuclear capability* If the Chinese were so equipped
now, it is doubtful that the Johnson Administration would
have taken the turn it did in February, 1965*
What, then, are some of the general conclusions that
can be drawn?
A limited war can be fought by the United States with
weapons ranging across the full spectrum available—from
trench knives to mega-ton nuclear devices* The greater the
destructive power of the means used, the less is its capa-
city for limitation in selectivity, destruction, or particu-
larization.
A long-range missile force must be "at the ready,"
to set the stage for the limitation of war* However, it is
not, by itself, sufficient in deterring all forms of aggres-
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a deterrent, to be effective, must, by definition, never be
applied*
The requirement is, therefore, established for an
effective second capability, that of deterring, and if
necessary, of winning limited wars.
A full capability of deterrence implies moral, psy-
chological, and political, as well as military means.
Physical force, in the context of the present international
situation, must be carefully tailored, in order to accom-
plish its purposes, to reasonable and limited objectives;
and it must be applied thoughtfully and with restraint.
The key to the conduct of limited war as a useful
tool of U.S. foreign policy is the realization that limited
war can only be an effective tool in a truly limited issue.
Generally speaking, these limited Issues are found in areas
and under circumstances of low priority to both antagonists.
These areas, in which either opponent can afford the luxury
of losing or withdrawing, are the only ones in which a
limited war policy could or should be applied. These areas
are growing fewer. The achievement by the Chinese People's
Republic of a tactical nuclear delivery capability will
summarily eliminate all of Southeast Asia as luxury areas
for an American limited war policy.
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